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Preface 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and the Supreme Court under his leadership have 
been charged, respectively, with leading and enacting a federalism revolution. From the 
beginning, Rehnquist, first as an associate justice and later as Chief Justice, has displayed a 
commitment to notions of constitutionalism, originalism, and federalism. In the years before 
Rehnquist joined the Supreme Court, the idea of federalism, what Felix Frankfurter described as 
"the happy relation of States to Nation," certainly underwent numerous transformations, altering 
it from what was originally intended into a doctrine far friendlier to the expansion of national 
power at the expense of the States. It is essential to understand these changes and their broader 
consequences for federalism doctrine in order to grasp the true implications of the federalism 
jurisprudence of Rehnquist and the Rehnquist Court. At the most basic level, Rehnquist upholds 
the notion of State sovereignty as a general principle rooted in the idea that the text of the 
Constitution has a fixed and knowable meaning, one that constrains both the Court and Congress. 
The Rehnquist Court's federalism cases can be divided into two categories: institutional 
federalism cases, and rights-based federalism cases. It is the fonner cases that constitute the new 
federalism of the Rehnquist Court. In rights-based cases the Court generally shuns the argument 
of State sovereignty, due largely to the swing votes of justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who 
often are persuaded to join their federalist colleagues Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas in 
institutional cases, but advance what they consider to be more pragmatic reasoning in rights-
based cases. As a result, the federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court is ultimately more 
a commitment to the ideas of judicial restraint than it is a commitment to federalism for 
federalism's sake. 
The so-called "federalism revolution" of the Rehnquist Court has not been a revolution at 
all, but merely a stop-gap measure by the majority of the Court trying to limit further expansion 
of the national government in particular areas. Concerns over a wholesale reversal or rollback of 
national prerogatives are largely unfounded for numerous reasons, not least that the federalist 
triumvirate on the Court is not able to unite a consistent majority in federalism cases. Without 
such a majority, it seems unlikely that either Rehnquist or the Rehnquist Court will seriously 
engage in the reconsideration of significant precedent cases that could, in fact, produce a true 
federalism revolution. 
Chapter One 
The Politics of Judicial Restraint: 
The Rehnquist Court and the New Federalism 
Under the chief justiceship of William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court has been 
described as leading a "federalism revolution."1 One scholar has noted that it "seems agreed on 
all sides now that the Supreme Court has an agenda of promoting constitutional federalism."2 
Indeed, the record shows that, in contrast to the most recent courts preceding it, the Rehnquist 
Court has engaged in a purposeful revival of federalism and the recognition of States' rights and 
sovereignty. The decisions the Court has rendered in a number of cases in support of State sovereignty 
have led to speculation about the course on which the Court seeks to set American jurisprudence. 
Some have lauded these pro-State power decisions, believing that the Court is reviving an important 
and necessary debate about the most fitting role of the federal government in America.3 Others have 
argued that the Court's jurisprudence damages the States and the Congress, and that it is in fact not 
even truly rooted in the Constitution, as proponents of the Court's philosophy claim.4 
It has been suggested that the modem day Rehnquist Court has, in fact, enacted a 
transformation of federalism above and beyond the arrangement that the founders intended.5 Others 
propose that there is no revolution, but rather ''what has occurred is a revitalization of a long-standing 
1 J. Mitchell Pickerell, "Leveraging Federalism: The Real Meaning of the Rehnquist Court's 
Federalism Jurisprudence For States," Albany Law Review 66 (2003): 823, 823. "The Rehnquist 
Court has been credited with, or accused of-depending on one's perspective- creating a 
'federalism revolution'." 
2 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism 
Decisions," University of Chicago Law Review 69 (2002): 429, 429. 
3 Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., "The Reconstitution of American Federalism? The Rehnquist Court and 
Federal-State Relations, 1991-1997 ," Publius 28 ( 1998): 189, 190, . 
4 Richard Briffault, "A Fickle Federalism: the Rehnquist Court Hobbles Congress-and the 
States. Too," The American Prospect 14 (2003): 26, 26. 
5 Pickerell, "Leveraging Federalism," 823. 
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interpretive conflict about the deployment of government power within a legally constituted regime" 
and that the debate is about ''how the political principles contained in the nation's foundational legal 
and historical texts, such as The Federalist and other records of the American Founders, ought to be 
interpreted by the justices.'.6 Still others, in response to the Court's renewed attention to federalism, 
have charged that the new conservative majority has been hastily overturning precedents, 
exchanging earlier dissents for new Court opinions because they now have the votes.7 
While there is no doubt that the Rehnquist Court has sought to revive federalism, the 
question remains as to whether that revival in fact constitutes a true "federalism revolution". In 
order to answer that larger question, the interpretive rationale for the Court's decisions must be 
understood, as well as the implications of the decisions that are touted as embodying this 
revolution. 
Rehnquist's Constitutional Interpretation 
Time and again, federalism decisions handed down by the Rehnquist Court have referred 
to the notion of original understanding as the basis of its judgments. 8 Originalism is one of 
several methods of constitutional interpretation, one to which Rehnquist himself has long tried to 
remain faithful. In the realm of constitutional theory, however, there has been a decided move 
away from an understanding of the Constitution as a fixed body of knowable law, the basis for 
the notion of original understanding, to a more amorphous and malleable conceptual 
6 Brisbin, "Reconstitution of American Federalism," 189. 
7 Fallon, "Conservative Paths," 430. 
8 
"We look first to the original understanding of the Constitution . . .," in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706 (1999); "I examine here the early American tradition of religious free exercise to gain 
insight into the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause .. .," in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); "I continue to believe that we must "temper our Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence" and return to an interpretation better rooted in the Clause's original 
understanding ... " in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 ( 1997). 
interpretation. The current trend is to perceive the Constitution as enumerating concepts that are 
rooted in a set of implied ''basic values", which in tum give rise to further values that are implicit 
in the text, but not explicitly stated.9 This constitutional notion and others like it can be 
described by the term "living Constitution". Those who subscribe to the doctrine of a "living 
Constitution" believe it is the judges' responsibility to ascertain what implied principles can be 
found in the text and then draw on these principles as the situation warrants. 
This idea that the Constitution does not have a particularly fixed meaning is one that Rehnquist 
soundly rejects. Four years after he was named an associate justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, he published an article on ''The Notion of a Living Constitution".10 The article offers a great 
deal of insight into his understanding of the Constitution and the originalist ideas of federalism he has 
long espoused. Furthermore, it also clearly illustrates Rehnquist's view of the proper constitutional role 
of judges, which allows for a greater understanding of the way he conceptualizes the function of federal 
courts as arbiters of the relationship between the national government and the governments of the 
several States. 
To Rehnquist, the phrase "living Constitution" is one of ''teasing imprecision". 11 "At first 
blush it seems certain," he writes, "that a living Constitution is better than what must be its counterpart, 
9 Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 103d Congress, 2d sess, 12-15 July 
1994, 355-356. "What the Framers thought is that the Constitution should adapt, preserving 
certain basic values. So, what are these values? ... You look back into history .. You try to 
determine what are the basic values that underlay those things which are enumerated, and that 
gives you a key to other basic values ... you look to history in the past, to history in the present, 
and to the meaning, to what life is like today, to try ... to get an idea of what are those things that 
are fundamental to a life of dignity." 
10 William H. Rehnquist, "The Notion of a Living Constitution," Texas Law Review 54 (May 
1976): 693. 
11 Ibid. 
a dead Constitution."12 But, as he explains, the dichotomy between notions of a "living" Constitution 
and a "dead" Constitution creates a false distinction The reason, Rehnquist suggests, is that the term 
"living Constitution" is "susceptible" to two vastly dissimilar meanings.13 
The first possible meaning Justice Rehnquist calls the ''Holmes version", which he finds in 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' opinion in Missouri v. Holland: 
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of 
the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the 
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of 
its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an 
organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation. 14 
In response, Justice Rehnquist notes that simply because the framers "could not have conceived" of 
certain eventualities "cannot mean that general language in the Constitution may not be applied to such 
a course of conduct".15 That is to say, Rehnquist understands that to argue that the Constitution covers 
only those things that those who originally drafted the document could take into account would be to 
render the document relatively useless as American society develops. Of course there will be new 
challenges that arise in every epoch; Rehnquist believes that the Framers' design was to create a 
Constitution that would serve as a framework that would allow the American political system to adapt 
to each new challenge. 
There is, he proposes, a second notion of a "living Constitution" that varies widely from the 
Holmesian notion of constitutional interpretation. This definition implies that certain contemporary 
and evolving values should be read into the language of the Constitution. To make his point, he cites a 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.' 693-694. 
14 State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
15 Rehnquist, "Notion of a Living Constitution," 694. 
brief filed on behalf of prisoners of a particular state who argue that the environment of their prison 
"offend[s] the United States Constitution."16 The brief exhorts the Court to take charge: 
We are asking a great deal of the Court because other branches of government have 
abdicated their responsibility ... Prisoners are like other "discrete and insular" 
minorities for whom the Court must spread its protective umbrella because no other 
branch of government will do so ... This Court, as the voice and conscience of 
contemporary society, as the measure of the modem conception of human dignity, 
must declare that the [named prison] and all it represents offends the Constitution of the 
United States and will not be tolerated. 17 
Rehnquist rejects this notion that judicial review is appropriately governed by a ''philosophical 
approach" that accepts the Supreme Court as ''the voice and conscience of contemporary society".18 
He does not believe that there is constitutional authority such that ''nonelected members of the federal 
judiciary may address themselves to a social problem simply because other branches of government 
have failed or refused to do so."19 
Building on the first approach to the idea of a "living Constitution", that the Constitution 
establishes a framework wherein the American political system can grow and adapt to changing times, 
Rehnquist turns to John Marshall's opinion establishing judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.20 
There, Marshall argues that the Court should consider the Constitution as elevated above government 
acts, but that if the other branches are acting within the authority granted to them by the Constitution, 
the Court has no constitutional right to interfere. In Marshall's view, it is essential that the justices 
understand that ''the framers of the Constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the 
government of courts, as well as of the legislature."21 
16 Ibid., 695. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. He will return to this argument thirteen years later in Deshaney v. Winnebago County 
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
20 Rehnquist, "Notion of a Living Constitution," 696. 
21 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179-180 (1803). 
Drawing on this, Rehnquist argues that because ''the judges will be merely interpreting an 
instrument framed by the people, they should be detached and objective." In his view, "a mere change 
in public opinion since the adoption of the Constitution, unaccompanied by a constitutional 
amendment, should not change the meaning of the Constitution."22 He echoes the argument of 
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 78, that judges "ought to regulate their decisions by the 
fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental."23 An amendment, Rehnquist 
believes, is the legitimate way to add new and different meaning and direction to the constitutional text. 
While Justice Rehnquist does note that there is "wide room for honest difference of opinion," 
he refuses to accept that these differences allow for judicial imposition of a will "independent of 
popular will. "24 In fact, he sees three serious flaws in this type of reasoning. First, he argues that the 
purpose of the Constitution is not simply to empower the judicial branch, but rather to "enable the 
popularly elected branches of government" to govem:25 
Surely the Constitution does not put either the legislative branch or the executive 
branch in the position of a television quiz show contestant so that when a given period 
of time has elapsed and a problem remains unsolved by them, the federal judiciary 
may press a buzzer and take its tum at fashioning a solution.26 
Second, he points out that attempts by the Supreme Court to apply this kind of doctrine 
historically often has had poor results, most notably with the Dred Scott v. Sandford27 and Lochner v. 
New Yortl-8 decisions. The credibility of the Court after Dred Scott, the justice notes, took a generation 
22 Rehnquist, ''Notion of a Living Constitution," 696-697. 
23 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter 
(New York: New American Library, 1961), 466. 
24 Rehnquist, "Notion of a Living Constitution," 697. 
25 Ibid., 699. 
26 Ibid., 700. 
27 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
28 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
to recover, with attacks on the Court "unequalled in their bitterness even to this day.''29 Not content 
with the argument that these cases were badly decided because they tried to incorporate the wrong 
extra-constitutional principle, Rehnquist insists that it is never legitimate for judges to incorporate any 
extra-constitutional principle--ever. 
Third, Justice Rehnquist believes that promoting "socially desirable" goals through an 
appointed judiciary runs counter to the most basic notions of democracy. 30 "Individual conscience," he 
points out, is what serves "as a platform for the launching of moral judgments. "31 As a result, he 
concludes that there is "no conceivable way'' to "logically demonstrate" that opinions of one 
conscience are superior to those of another. 32 
I know of no other method compatible with political theory basic to democratic society 
by which one's own conscientious belief may be translated into positive law and 
thereby obtain the only general moral imprimatur permissible in a pluralistic, 
democratic society. It is always time consuming, frequently difficult, and not 
infrequently impossible to run successfully the legislative gauntlet and have enacted 
some facet of one's own deeply felt value judgments. It is even more difficult for.either 
a single individual or indeed for a large group ofindividuals to succeed in having such 
a value judgment embodied in the Constitution. All of these burdens and difficulties 
are entirely consistent with the notion of democratic society ... it should not be easier 
just because the individual in question is ajudge.33 
Rehnquist does not believe in the notion of a "living Constitution" because to do so is to accept 
an individual judge's notions of morality as the basis of constitutional law. He argues not that 
the Constitution is "dead" in that it has no real and relevant meaning for contemporary judges 
and lawmakers; rather, he supports a view of the Constitution as fundamentally knowable and 
unalterable by mere interpretation. His is not a "living" or a "dead" Constitution, but a 
29 Rehnquist, "Notion of a Living Constitution," 702. 
30 Ibid., 699. 
31 Ibid., 704. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 705-706. 
9 
permanent one. In this way, Justice Rehnquist believes the Constitution itself demands judicial 
restraint in matters of constitutional law. 
The limited and defined nature of constitutional provisions must be respected and 
understood by judges: 
It is essential for those engaged in judicial interpretation to realize that the 
underpinnings of our legal system depend upon the assumption that such words 
have an objective meaning-one set of words, that is, has a different meaning 
from another set. 
He does not, however, advocate a simplistic and formulaic approach to judging or the 
Constitution. 
This is not to say that the meaning of a particular set of words will be crystal 
clear to each judge who is called upon to interpret it, but only that those judges, 
familiar with the ordinary English usage, will be able to agree that the words at 
their broadest embrace only so much, and necessarily exclude matter beyond 
that.34 
As is argued above, Rehnquist's rejection of unwarranted insertions of extra-textual notions into 
the Constitution is grounded in his view that elements of constitutional doctrine may only change 
on the basis of formal constitutional amendment.35 
Rehnquist's Federalism Revolution? 
It is clear that Rehnquist places federalism at the top of his hierarchy of constitutional 
values.36 This is shown in the justice's own opinions, and is arguably mirrored in the direction 
34 William Rehnquist, "The Nature of Judicial Interpretation" (Speech delivered at the American 
Studies Center Conference on the Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution, Washington, D.C., 
June 12, 1987), p. 1., as quoted in McDowell, "Language and the Limits of Judging: Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's Jurisprudence of Common Sense," in American Conservative Opinion 
Leaders, p. 242. 
35 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974), Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-448 
(1976). 
36 Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1989), 32. 
the Court under his leadership has taken on federalism issues. While federalism undeniably 
holds a significant place among Rehnquist's general principles of adjudication, the question still 
remains as to whether such a commitment is truly about federalism for federalism's sake. At first 
glance, such a question may seem incongruous with the current reputation of the Rehnquist 
Court and the volume of material produced by Rehnquist himself championing notions of State 
sovereignty; however, such a question is legitimate and necessary to understand fully the Court's 
new federalism and its broader institutional implications. 
Critics of the Rehnquist Court have decried the seeming lack of weight it extends to 
precedent cases. It is quite true that the Chief Justice, at least, believes with Thomas Hobbes that 
precedent only shows ''what was done, and not what was well done".37 If a constitutionalized 
principle is historically inaccurate, Rehnquist does not believe courts are required to uphold it on 
the grounds that it is bad law. "Stare decisis may bind courts as to matters oflaw, but it cannot 
bind them as to matters ofhistory''38 He believes that individuals should not have particular 
policies "thrust upon them" by perhaps appropriately sympathetic but overzealous judges who 
extend the Constitution's text beyond what he sees as its reasonable meaning.39 Indeed, 
important decisions of constitutional law are not subject to the same command of 
stare decisis as are decisions of statutory questions. Surely there can be no more 
fundamental constitutional question than that of the intention of the Framers of 
the Constitution as to how authority should be allocated between the National and 
State Governments. 40 
While it is true that Rehnquist has expressed a less than complete faith in the supremacy 
of precedents, it is important to note the sort of precedents that continue to stand, despite the 
37 Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogu.e between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of 
England, Ed. J. Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 129. 
38 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1984). 
39 Deshaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1988). 
4° Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975). 
Rehnquist Court's foray into the questions of federalism doctrine. Rehnquist rarely, if ever, 
more than briefly considers cases that are foundational to the extension of the Court's and 
Congress's power in relation to the States and which arguably extend past the point that he 
would consider to be constitutionally appropriate; these cases certainly appear to be in no danger 
of being overruled.41 The continued acceptance of these cases as valid, not necessarily overtly, 
but at least by their omission in the Court's federalism discussions, suggests that the Rehnquist 
Court's federalism revolution is at best an incomplete one. 
One key case of this nature that illustrates this tendency is Wickard v. Filburn, decided 
November 9, 1942.42 In Wickard, the Court found that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress 
to regulate the local production of wheat on private farms because such action in aggregate could 
have an effect on interstate commerce. This reading of the Clause arguably vastly extended the 
limits of a plenary power of Congress to involve itself in localized activities, without any 
explicitly textual basis. Such an expansion would seem to cut against the arguments that 
Rehnquist himself extends about the appropriate interpretation of constitutional text: 
It is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note that one of 
the greatest "fictions" of our federal system is that the Congress exercises only 
those powers delegated to it, while the remainder are reserved to the States or to 
the people. The manner in which this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
amply illustrates the extent of this fiction.43 
Rehnquist cites Wickard as a case in point for expansion of congressional power; however, 
though arguing that it is important to continue to acknowledge that Congress's power has 
"constitutional limits", he does not suggest that Wickard is constitutionally flawed.44 
41 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 3 79 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).; 
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 486 (1966) are just three examples. 
42 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
43 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981). 
44 lbid., 308-309. 
Why would Rehnquist accept Wickard, when, for all intents and purposes, it extends the 
same extra-textual constitutional legitimacy to legislation and policies as other cases that 
Rehnquist rejects?45 It seems that Rehnquist should reject Wickard as a clear example of an 
overbroad interpretation on the same grounds that he rejects others-that such a measure falls 
outside the original meaning of the constitutional text. Yet, he does not. Neither Rehnquist-
nor the Rehnquist Court, for that matter-have seriously dealt with Wickard as a constitutional 
issue, even though the case is one of the clearest examples of the very things that proponents of 
original understanding abhor, an understanding which is, after all, the philosophical basis for 
Rehnquist's notions of federalism. 
The answer to this question about the legitimacy of Wickard may seem mystifying on its 
face, but it is in fact one of eminent practicality. It is apparent that Rehnquist, for all his talk of 
original understanding, does not really believe that the American system of government as it 
currently stands can be returned to the original constitutional conception, although he may 
believe that would be the ideal.46 Political realities seem to demand that he accept past decisions 
of the Court that have allowed for certain extra-textual provisions, provided they are not 
. . I h . ~ 47 unconstitutlona on t eir iace. 
45 See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 
U.S. 662 (1981). 
46 There are others, like Edward C. Banfield, who argue that federalism was doomed from the 
first because of the nature of popular government. "Nothing of importance can be done to stop 
the spread of federal power, let alone to restore something like the division of powers agreed 
upon by the framers of the Constitution. The reason lies in human nature: men cannot be relied 
upon voluntarily to abide by their agreements, including those upon which their political order 
depends. There is an antagonism, amounting to an incompatibility, between popular 
government-meaning government in accordance with the will of the people-and the 
maintenance of limits on the sphere of government. This ... constitutes 'the dilemma of popular 
government."' Edward C. Banfield, Here the People Rule: Selected Essays (Washington, D.C.: 
The AEI Press, 1991), 24. 
47 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846 (1976). 
The Politics of Judicial Restraint 
Debates over federalism at the founding are quite different from federalism debates 
today. Then, the debates centered narrowly around the legitimacy of allegedly implied powers 
for the national government; today it is widely accepted that some of the national government's 
powers are indeed unenumerated. What is more, many projects and policies of the federal 
government that are integral to its functioning are based on such unenumerated powers. 
Federalism questions, as a result, are simply not posed in the same way as they were originally. 
It is clear that too much has been done, and too much time has passed, to expect realistically to 
recover the lost world of the Founders. It is apparent that Rehnquist realizes this, one way or 
another. While one may argue that Rehnquist's constitutional philosophy is unnecessarily rigid, 
it is more difficult to make the case that he holds fantastical expectations. Federalism, rather 
than an ideal for its own sake, is one way that Rehnquist, and perhaps those on the Court who 
agree with certain of these notions, can limit any further damage to a system that he perceives as 
being already fundamentally out of balance. 48 In this way, Rehnquist's federalism jurisprudence 
should be understood as part of a larger strategy of affirming the notions of judicial restraint. As 
a result, his controlling philosophy necessitates not so much a revolution, but a sort of damage 
48 Rehnquist rejects the political safeguards theory, originally proposed by Herbert Wechsler, 
which suggests that the balance between federal and State power can be appropriately 
maintained without any judicial intervention, because the structure of the national government is 
such that the States themselves can resist federal laws that overreach their limits (Wechsler 
argued, by influencing the national political process by virtue of State actors involvement in the 
various branches, particularly the Congress); thus, judicial review of federal laws and their limits 
is unnecessary. Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government," Columbia Law Review 54 
(1954): 546, 559. 
control. Federalism becomes just one tool with which to say-effectively, perhaps- "This far, 
but no farther." 
Certainly, the relationship between the powers of the nation and the powers of the States 
has undergone many transfonnations since the Founding. Each of the transmutations that this 
relationship endured made an indelible impression on the way federalism was understood by the 
time Rehnquist was named to the Court. Understanding this extensive, and often convoluted, 
history is essential to understanding the role that Rehnquist, and the Rehnquist Court, has played 
in the continuing history of federalism. 
Chapter Two 
The Evolution of Federalism 
Since the beginning of the American constitutional experiment, the appropriate balance in the 
relationship between the nation and the States has been a central debate in American political life. 
Indeed, when the Founding Fathers gathered in Philadelphia to draft the Constitution, they brought with 
them diverse views about the correct nature of this relationship. Initially, the new nation was organized 
under the Articles of Confederation, based on the notion of confederalism, that created not a true 
government but merely established "a finn league of friendship" among the sovereign States.49 The 
central proposition of the theory of confederalism was that sovereign bodies could contract to fonn a 
union for very specific and limited purposes, without forfeiting any of their sovereignty. The 
weaknesses of confederalism, which were apparent to many from the inception of the Articles of 
Confederation, were the primary reasons that led to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, where a 
more nationalistic approach to the union was advocated. This approach eventually supplanted the 
con federalism of the Articles of Confederation. Such writings as The Federalist and the essays of 
the leading Anti-Federalists reveal the difficult process of detennining which principles would ground 
the new United States of America. 
"Federalism" originally meant the same thing as "confederalism", the idea that a union 
consisted of basically autonomous States. In a brilliant political and rhetorical move, those who 
supported a move from pure "federalism" or "confederalism" towards a true nation appropriated the 
name "Federalists" for themselves, leaving the true defenders of"federalism" to be called the "Anti-
Federalists." The Federalists were convinced that the new constitution they advocated was not an 
49 
"Articles of Confederation 1777 (1781 )," in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional 
Convention Debates, ed. Ralph Ketcham (New York: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1986), 357. 
16 
abandonment of the principle of federalism, but merely "a judicious modification" ofit.50 As 
Federalist Alexander Hamilton wrote 
The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State 
governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by 
allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession 
certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully 
corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal 
government. 51 
The Federalists defended the idea of a strong central government, while the so-called Anti-
Federalists voiced concerns about the potential of such a system to threaten the republican freedoms 
that had only recently been won from Britain, arguing that strong States, not a more consolidated 
nation, would best safeguard these freedoms. The Federalists criticized the ineffectiveness of the 
present confederation-it was, they said repeatedly, unable to meet the "exigencies of the union"-
while the Anti-Federalists voiced powerful concerns that in forming the new federal system, the 
sovereignty of the States eventually would be lost. 52 
From the Founding to the Civil War 
These debates about the relationship of nation to States were central to the creation of the 
American republic. From these two starkly different political understandings, a Constitution emerged 
that was, as James Madison noted, ''neither wholly federal nor wholly national," what Tocqueville 
would later call "an incomplete national government."53 Some believed that it was not theoretically 
possible for two sovereignties to exist within the same borders, but the reality was that "the 
50 James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, 322. 
51 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 9, 71. 
52 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 31, 191. 
53 James Madison, The Federalist No. 39, 243; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 
eds. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 
149. 
intense attachment of the Founders to the sovereignty and independence of their States 
compelled theory to bend to political necessity."54 Alexander Hamilton argued for the notion 
that both the States and the nation could be sovereign. "That two supreme powers cannot act 
together is false," he argued. "They are inconsistent only when they are aimed ... at one 
indivisible object."55 He further tried to ease the fears of those who were convinced the 
arrangement would lead to the demise of the States by insisting that it would always "be far more 
easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national 
government to encroach upon the State authorities."56 The Constitution granted only limited and 
enumerated powers to the national government; the very nature of the document established and 
confirmed the fundamental power of the States in any but these specifically distinguished areas. 
"But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation. the State 
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which 
were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States."5'. 
The Constitution codified and embodied this notion of dual sovereignty. Practically, dual 
sovereignty meant that the United States was"~ confederation in which the central authority had 
enforceable supremacy only in sharply limited areas, with the States retaining their sovereignty 
in all others."58 Much later, the Court would note that if the Constitution had sought to "reduce 
the [states] to little more than geographical subdivisions of the national domain ... it would never 
54 Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1987), 50. 
55 Jonathan Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1836), 355-356. 
56 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 17, 114. 
57 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 32, 194. 
58 William Murphy, The Triumph of Nationalism: State Sovereignty, the Founding Fathers, and 
the Making of the Constitution (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), 147-148. 
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have been ratified."59 Indeed, James Madison argued that the Constitution itself was established 
not by "a national but [by] a federal act."60 
The practicalities of this neither-federal-nor-national relationship, however, had yet to be 
worked out, and much of the responsibility for interpreting the specifics of that relationship 
would fall to the Supreme Court. In the fledgling young nation, the Supreme Court was in a 
unique situation, positioned, as it were, without a foundation of precedents, at least in terms of 
the positive constitutional law of the new nation. From the beginning, the Court would play a 
crucial role in debates over federalism; it would become a truism that "the happy relation of 
States to Nation-constituting as it does our central political problem-is to no small extent 
dependent upon the wisdom with which the scope and limits of the federal courts are 
determined. " 61 
Anti-Federalists were apprehensive about the potential power of the national government 
and the possible threats posed by a "consolidated government."62 In order to bring about 
ratification, the Federalists agreed to a post-ratification inclusion of amendments to spell out 
protections for individual citizens and States from incursions of national power; this document 
was known as the Bill of Rights. The amendments enacted, however, did not simply deal with 
individual liberty-they constitutionalized restrictions on the power of national government, 
despite some Federalists' protestations that such measures were superfluous because the 
59 Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238, 295-296 (1936). 
60 Madison, The Federalist No. 39, 239. 
61 Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the 
Federal Judicial System (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), 2. 
62 
"Speeches of Patrick Henry" in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention 
Debates, ed. Ralph Ketcham, 207. 
government possessed only delegated powers.63 The Tenth Amendment is particularly addressed 
to the concerns of the relationship between nation and States, and promises that: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved 
to the states respectively, or to the people." As James Madison had written in The Federalist, 
No. 45, 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external 
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce ... The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.64 
In the early days of the American republic, debates about federalism centered almost 
entirely around the issue of enumerated and unenumerated powers. Initially, the decision-
making of the Supreme Court concerning federalism revealed tensions and some confusion about 
the justices' role in arbitrating the relationship between nation and States. In Chisholm v. 
Georgia (1793 ), the Court held that States were subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
when in conflict with citizens of other States. This doctrine subordinating the States was 
arguably not the intention of those who drafted the Constitution; in fact, Chisholm served as the 
stimulus for the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment.65 
The Supreme Court under John Marshall, who became Chief Justice in 1801, would do 
much for codifying and clarifying the Court's role and policies in questions of federalism. 
Marshall led the Court in establishing a doctrine of national supremacy within certain 
63 The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, ed. Alfred A. Kelly, Winfred A. 
Harbison, and Hennan Belz (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991),18. 
64 James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, 289. 
65 The Eleventh Amendment reads "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 
boundaries. The seminal case demonstrative of this nationalizing influence was the Court's 
holding in McCulloch v. Marylancf6, which arose over the congressional chartering of the 
Second Bank of the United States in 1816. The concerns raised in McCulloch are grounded in 
the misgivings that were raised when the subject of a national bank was first proposed in 1791. 
In the debate over the proposal to establish the First Bank of the United States, a major clash 
occurred concerning the notion of implied or inferred powers. Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson opposed the establishment of a national bank on the grounds that the Tenth 
Amendment allowed only for enumerated powers. Arguing that to "take a single step beyond the 
boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a 
boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition," Jefferson strongly advocated 
limiting the powers of the national govemrnent.67 The Constitution made no mention of any 
power to establish a bank, and Jefferson believed that the "necessary and proper" clause should 
be construed to mean that only those things absolutely necessary to achieve responsibilities 
granted to the national government were allowable; he did not include the bank in his strict 
interpretation. 68 
James Madison, who had argued in The Federalist in favor of a strong national 
government, nevertheless opposed the establishment of a national bank on the grounds that it 
was unconstitutional, for ''the Constitution was not a general grant, with specified exceptions of 
particular powers, but rather the reverse." The enumerated powers "subjoined" to the clauses 
that were offered in support of the measure, Madison pointed out, did not include any such 
66 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819). 
67 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boyd et al. (Princeton, N.J ., 1950-), 275-280. 
68 Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 
1788-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 233. 
provision.69 "The doctrine of 'implication' and 'construction,' he declared, was infinitely 
dangerous; with it could be formed a chain that would reach all objects whatever.''70 
Disclaiming his own earlier position regarding the national government's power, Madison, with 
Jefferson, argued for the strict construction of the Constitution.71 
The proposal for the national bank had been drafted by Alexander Hamilton, who argued 
that "every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and includes ... the right to 
employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such 
power."72 The essence of his case was that the legal test for "necessary and proper" was 
extremely fluid, and that in order to fulfill the functions commissioned to it in the Constitution, 
the national government clearly had to be able to act in ways that may not be explicitly stated in 
the Constitution. Proponents of Hamilton's plan argued that it was "rather late in the day to 
adopt [Madison's argument] as a principle of conduct" as implication and construction had been 
used to establish many other laws.73 Furthermore, the argument followed that in establishing the 
bank they did not seek to give new powers under the "necessary and proper" clause, but simply 
to establish the doctrine of implied powers.74 The doctrine of implied powers held "that 
construction may be maintained to be a safe one which promotes the good of the society, and the 
ends for which the Government was adopted, without impairing the rights of any man, or the 
powers of any State."75 In the end, this argument triumphed, and the doctrine of implied powers, 
69 Elkins and McKitrick, 230. 
70 Ibid., 230. 
71 Ibid., 224. 
72 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett et al. 26 vols. (New York: Columbia 
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the notion that not all powers of the national government were enumerated, began to gain 
legitimacy. 
This debate was only recent history when McCulloch v. Maryland was brought before the 
Supreme Court. Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States in 1816. In 1818, the 
State of Maryland enacted legislation that would tax the bank that was within its borders. When 
the bank refused to pay the tax, the case was taken to the Supreme Court, to decide on the 
constitutional legitimacy of two questions: whether Congress had the authority to establish a 
bank, and if so, whether Maryland's tax was an unconstitutional intrusion on that authority. The 
Supreme Court unanimously found in McCulloch v. Maryland16 that Congress had the authority 
to establish a bank: 
The government of the United States ... though limited in its powers, is supreme; 
and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of 
the land ... Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not 
find the word "bank" or "incorporation" ... it may with great reason be contended, 
that a government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of 
which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be 
entrusted with ample means for their execution . . . [on the necessary and proper 
clause] To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future 
time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the 
instrument. .. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable 
rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and 
which can be best provided for as they occur77 
Furthermore, the Court found that it was unconstitutional for Maryland to infringe on Congress's 
execution of its constitutional powers by imposing a tax, 
The constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme ... they 
control the constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled 
by them ... the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,. 
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted 
by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in general government. 
76 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819). 
77 Ibid., 317-318. 
This is, we think, and unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the 
constitution has declared. 78 
McCulloch v. Maryland was not simply about the Supreme Court deciding the question of the 
national bank. Fundamentally, the case encompassed the entire question of the practical 
constitutional relationship between the States and the nation, and established the Supreme Court 
as central to the sorting out of this relationship. Furthermore, it constitutionally legitimated the 
notion that some of the powers of the national govenunent were unenumerated. 
While McCulloch v. Maryland was often cited as the most pivotal federalism case 
considered by the Marshall Court, numerous cases decided by the Court had a nationalizing 
influence on the Court's continuing federalism adjudication. Two such cases were Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee79 and Cohens v. Virginia;80 both dealt with the constitutional power of the 
Supreme Court in relation to State courts, and both ultimately established the preeminence of the 
Supreme Court. Martin considered whether the Constitution gave the Supreme Court appellate 
power over Virginia courts, and Cohens asked whether the Supreme Court could review rulings 
of the Virginia Supreme Court. 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee came about when a Virginia court refused to recognize a claim 
to land by Denny Martin, the descendent of Loyalist Lord Fairfax, instead holding that State 
confiscation laws overrode the 1783 treaty of peace with Great Britain and the Jay Treaty, which 
guaranteed such holdings.81 This was especially significant because the Supreme Court had 
affirmed the supremacy of the treaties; thus, in finding against Martin the Virginia court was 
78 Ibid., 330. 
79 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
8° Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
81 Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1996), 427. 
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flagrantly flouting the authority of the Supreme Court.82 The case was appealed to the Supreme 
Court, who was to decide whether the State and national government were equally sovereign. In 
a ')udicial tour de force ... that would become the keystone in the arch of the Supreme Court's 
appellate authority," the Court held that "the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of 
decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the 
constitution" required appellate jurisdiction for the Supreme Court and further, that "the 
constitution not only contemplated, but meant to provide for cases within the scope of the 
judicial power of the United States" with section 25 of the Judiciary Act. 83 
The holding in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee "provided the rationale for the supremacy of 
the Union" employed in later cases like Cohens v. Virginia.84 The brothers Cohen illegally sold 
82 Ibid., 426. 
83 Ibid.; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-348, 342 (1816). 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act reads: And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree 
in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be 
had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised 
under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question 
the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being 
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour 
of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the 
constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the 
decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either 
party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of 
error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge or chancellor of the court rendering 
or passing the judgment or decree complained o_f, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the 
same effect, as ifthe judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a circuit 
court, and the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme 
Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision as before provided, may at their 
discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the 
same, and award execution. But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of 
reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and 
immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said 
constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute. 
84 Smith, Definer of a Nation, 430. 
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lottery tickets and were convicted under a State law by the Virginia Supreme Court. The case 
was brought on writ of error to the Supreme Court, where Virginia argued that it was the State 
courts, and not the Supreme Court, who had the final constitutional authority when conflict arose 
between a State and the nation. 85 The justices rejected this view, however, and Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over "all cases arising under the 
Constitution," and furthermore, that "the constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are 
repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void."86 Although the 
Court affirmed the Virginia court's conviction, in rejecting the State's jurisdictional argument, 
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over constitutional questions in the States was firmly 
established. 
The next case to arise concerning the relationship between the power of the States and the 
power of the nation was Gibbons v. Ogden, which dealt with the Commerce Clause.87 The State 
of New York had granted exclusive operating rights within its waters, including the waters 
between itself and other States, to several individuals. An individual who already operated a 
ferry in the waters between New Jersey and New York under a license granted by an Act of 
Congress in 1793 brought a challenge against New York's authority to extend its grant on the 
grounds that the State was interfering with the power to regulate interstate commerce given to 
Congress by the Commerce Clause. In the case, the Supreme Court had to determine whether 
both the New York statute and the Congressional statute could stand, and what relationship the 
two had to the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
8~ Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 377 (1821). 
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Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found that the New York statute violated 
the Supremacy Clause, which stated that "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land ... the ... Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The power 
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause validated the federal legislation of 1793 and 
invalidated the law passed by New York. Marshall defined the commerce power, writing 
It was in vain to look for a precise and exact definition of the powers of Congress, 
on several subjects. The constitution did not undertake the task of making such 
exact definitions. In confering powers, it proceeded in the way of enumeration, 
stating the powers conferred, one after another, in few words; and, where. the 
power was general, or complex in its nature, the extent of the grant must 
necessarily be judged of, and limited, by its object, and by the nature of the 
power.88 
Although the Commerce Clause did not specifically articulate that the States would not also 
possess power to regulate interstate commerce, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the 
granting of power to Congress seemed a clear abrogation of that authority. Otherwise, the 
elucidation of such a grant was pointless, and a confusing situation wherein both the States and 
the nation would have sovereignty within the same sphere would result. Strict construction of 
the Commerce Clause-assuming that the States also had power to regulate interstate 
commerce-would frustrate the meaning of the clause and render it obsolete. 
While Marshall affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce, he 
also made quite clear that there were limits to the argument that the Court presented. 
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause was not to be interpreted as reaching beyond 
specific commercial limits. 
The power, as granted in the constitution, is a limited power. It is a clear 
principle, that when the means of executing any given.power are specified in the 
88 Ibid., 10-11. 
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grant, Congress cannot take, by implication, any other means, as being necessary 
and proper to carry that power into execution. This power, then, is limited.89 
Marshall made clear that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause was limited by the 
specific nature of commerce, and even more so by the fact that it could only regulate "among the 
several states." While the decision affirmed an aspect of the national government's power, it 
was careful to also maintain the doctrine of State sovereignty. 
An equally significant case that had heavy bearing on federalism in constitutional terms 
was that of Barron v. Baltimore.90 The case asked an important and significant question: what 
was the relationship of the Bill of Rights to the States? John Barron sued the city of Baltimore 
for losses incurred when the city's development damaged the profitability of his wharf. He 
contended that under the Fifth Amendment, the State could not take his "private property" for 
"public use" without ''just compensation".91 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice 
Marshall rejected the claim that the States could be held liable for Barron's financial losses under 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court, he argued, had no jurisdiction in the case. 
The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much 
difficulty. The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the 
United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the 
government of the individual States. Each State established a constitution for 
itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the 
powers of its particular government, as its judgment dictated. The people of the 
United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed 
best adapted to their situation and best calculated to promote their interests. The 
powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the 
89 Ibid., 45. 
90 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
91 The Fifth Amendment reads, "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
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limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, 
necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are 
limitations of power granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, 
framed by different persons and for different purposes. If these propositions be 
correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the 
general government, not as applicable to the States.92 
Marshall argued that the nature of the Constitution itself, as well as the intentions of those who 
framed and drafted that document and the Bill of Rights, could not be construed to mean that the 
Bill ofRights applied to the States. 
Although the debate about the constitutionality of the national bank lapsed for the time 
being, bolstered by the support of McCulloch v. Maryland, the "bank war", as it were, would be 
taken up again in 1832. Opposition to the bank continued to be expressed in terms of federalism 
concerns. President Andrew Jackson vetoed the re-chartering of the bank because he believed it 
to be a "violation of ... the principle of dual federalism" because it granted sole control over 
monetary issues to the national government without an explicit textual basis.93 He argued that 
the Executive and Legislature were not permanently "bound by the judiciary's reading of the 
Constitution, but rather were obliged to interpret the fundamental law for themselves."94 
Arguing that even the Supreme Court had conceded that what was "necessary and proper" for the 
national government to accomplish the goals it was charged with was a question of political 
discretion, Jackson opposed this extension of federal power. 
Illustrating the complicated nature of the dual sovereignty position, Jackson that same 
year demonstrated a commitment to national supremacy during the nullification crisis in South 
Caro1ina.95 Outraged by the perceived injustices of a protective tariff, South Carolinians 
92 Barron v. Baltimore, 247. 
93 Kelly et al., The American Constitution, 205-206. 
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95 Ibid., 208-212. 
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challenged the legitimacy of the federal statute, and began to mobilize a fighting force.96 
Jackson, though in agreement that the tariff was an "instrument of anti-republican privilege," 
argued that the constitutional compact into which the States entered "created a 'binding 
obligation' and was backed by an explicit sanction that made an attempt to destroy the 
government by force an offense punishable under the public law of self-defense".97 Indeed, he 
contended that "[t]o say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union is to say that the 
United States are not a nation."98 Jackson requested from Congress the ability to cail up the 
army and navy to quell a violent uprising, which was granted to him in the form of the Force 
Bill.99 Eventually, a Compromise Tariff that appeased the South Carolinians was enacted, 
rendering the use of force unnecessary, but the enactment of the Force Bill had far-reaching 
ideological implications concerning the ultimate supremacy of the nation within the 
constitutional compact. In many ways, the call to anns by South Carolinians was an effort on the 
part of slaveholders to substantively bolster their claims of State sovereignty that were being 
challenged by abolitionists advocating a national moratorium on slavery. The relative failure of 
this movement as a result of the assertion of national supremacy implicit in the presidential call-
to-arms "irretrievably smashed" this hope.100 
The morally contentious issue of slavery certainly heightened the significance of the 
federalism question. During the antebellum era those who advocated the idea that the national 
government had certain unenumerated powers and prerogatives began increasingly to clash with 
those who advocated States' rights. The Civil War, in part, was about this very notion of States' 
96 William W. Freehling. Prelude to Civil war: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 280-284. 
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rights, nascent in the South Carolina nullifiers argument: what State policies were outside the 
national reach, and how strong were the claims of the States against the nation? 
The growing controversies over slavery in the United States were intensified by 
continued westward expansion, which had a fundamental effect on the debates about how 
sovereign were the respective spheres of State and national power. For slave-holding 
Southerners, the rising tide of antislavery sentiment threatened their existence and way of life, 
and the territorial issue came "to symbolize a struggle for survival."101 In an effort to minimize 
the escalation of tension, Congress enacted what came to be known as the Missouri Compromise. 
Originally, the bill regarding the statehood of Missouri contained an amendment that sought to 
restrict slavery in the new territory, prompting heated debates about the function and role of the 
national government in relation to individual States' practices. 102 These debates were especially 
contentious because representation of slave States and free States were equal in the Senate. 
When the territory of Maine also applied for statehood, the two applications were combined into 
one bill, and the original amendment was altered to prohibit slavery in the Louisiana Purchase 
north of 36° 30' .103 After much deliberation and several losing votes, the Missouri Compromise 
finally passed the House and the Senate in 1820, with unresolved questions as to its 
constitutionality. Controversy over the involvement of the national government in regulating the 
decisions of States only escalated as a result of the Missouri Compromise. The Kansas-Nebraska 
101 Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 165. 
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Act of 1854 eventually repealed the law.104 Shortly thereafter, the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford 
was brought before the Supreme Court of the United States.105 
Dred Scott at its broadest asked the Supreme Court to decide whether the national 
government embodied in Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the Missouri 
Compromise, and to determine the constitutional status of slavery in the territories.106 At this 
point, the North possessed a political, economic, and numerical "preponderance" and was 
convinced that it possessed a "moral duty'' to "make the nation over in its own image". The 
South found itself continually reacting against attacks on the States' ability to do as they might 
choose with regard to slavery, and the Dred Scott case became representative of this ongoing 
struggle. Dred Scott, a slave, sued for his freedom in a Missouri court, but his claim that his 
former residence in a free part of the Louisiana territory made him a free man was rejected. 107 
The case was brought on appeal to the Supreme Court, and further provocation of the already 
divisive States' rights issue was the inevitable result. Significantly, Chief Justice Taney, who 
wrote the opinion of the Court, argued that it was unconstitutional for Congress to enact the 
Missouri Compromise because it violated due process in the taking of private property. 
Congress could not make a law that, for example, quartered troops in people's homes, Taney 
argued; likewise, they could not make a law that amounted to a seizure of one-'s property if one 
changed geographic location. This was the first instance of a Supreme Court justice giving 
credence to the notion of Substantive Due Process-that the Due Process Clause contained not 
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only procedural, but also substantive rights guarantees-which would so affect questions of 
l'-...1 l" . 1 108 11A1era ism m ater years. 
When Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, said that no slave could be 
considered a citizen, the Court effectively destroyed any legal means by which the States could 
come to a peaceful resolution on the issue of slavery. The Dred Scott decision, in essence, 
affirmed a constitutional right to slave-holding and denied the national government any role in 
arbitrating the difficult issue."109 When Abraham Lincoln, a staunch critic of the decision, was 
elected to the presidency, secession by the Southern States soon followed. Lincoln, like Jackson, 
rejected secession as a constitutional right. The Civil War very clearly showed the practical 
significance of federalism debates in America that seemed, on their face, quite theoretical. 
While the debate over the constitutiOnal rights of States had certainly not been peaceful for some 
time, the Civil War became the bloodiest escalation of that controversy in the history of the 
United States, and with the eventual defeat of the South and its belief in State's rights, the 
original understanding of federalism would be altered in fundamental ways. 
From the Civil War to the New Deal 
The political debate over federalism was certainly affected by the Civil War, but the lines 
of argument remained largely unchanged. "Notwithstanding that the States' Rights doctrine had 
been badly tarnished by its association with secession, there remained a deep-seated attachment 
to State sovereignty" in post-Civil War America. 110 The notion of dual federalism, that the 
States maintained jurisdiction over most areas outside those specifically granted to Congress, 
108 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1990), 43. 
109 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 516. 
110 Berger, The Founders' Design, 158. 
was still very much the order of the day. This idea would persist from the antebellum period 
through the early 1930s. 111 
The post-Civil War Congress enacted the Thirteenth Amendment, along with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, in order to abolish slavery. The purpose of the Civil Rights Act, which was 
based on the Thirteenth Amendment, was to "provide a permanent guarantee of rights equality" 
for the newly freed slaves.112 In spite of the Thirteenth Amendment----0r perhaps in response to 
it-many southern States passed "black codes" limiting the freedoms of newly freed slaves.113 It 
became clear to those who had enacted the amendment and the Civil Rights Act that neither the 
Act nor the amendment were explicit enough to provide a sufficient "constitutional basis" to 
prevent or correct State abuses of freed blacks enabled by indirect means, such as citizenship 
requirements. 114 This concern prompted the drafting .and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
in order to restate and to reaffirm the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act and address the 
citizenship issue. The most significant and lasting alteration of the relationship between the 
States and the nation to come out of the Civil War was the Fourteenth Amendment, which, 
contributing as it did to the rise of Substantive Due Process, ushered in a new era for federalism. 
The most pertinent sections of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to federalism were 
sections 1 and 5, which read, respectively: 
111 Charles A. Lofgren, "The Origins of the Tenth Amendment: History, Sovereignty, and the 
Problems of Constitutional Intention," in Constitutional Government in America: Essays and 
Proceedings from Southwestern University Law Review's First West Coast Conference on 
Constitutional Law, ed. Ronald K. L. Collins (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), 
331. 
112 Kelly et al., The American Constitution, 330.; The Thirteenth Amendment reads, "Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction ... Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." 
113 Kelly et al., The American Constitution, 327-328. 
114 Ibid .• 332. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizen of the United States; not shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
John Bingham, who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, said, "the care of the property, the 
liberty, and the life of the citizen ... is in the States and not in the federal government. I have 
sought to effect no change in that respect."115 Indeed, "nearly all said that it was but an 
incorporation of the Civil Rights Bill ... there was no controversy as to its purpose and 
meaning."116 Under this understanding, the Fourteenth Amendment simply allowed the power of 
review over State laws that did not guarantee equal rights. 
Initially, the Fourteenth Amendment had little, if any, appreciable impact on questions of 
federalism outside the strictly limited sphere of the original intent of the amendment: achieving 
parity in legal treatment for former slaves. One of the first and seminal instances of an effort to 
apply the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to State regulations not regarding a civil 
rights issue came in The Slaughterhouse Cases .117 Butchers challenging Louisiana state 
regulations of their industry claimed guarantees against such legislation under three clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment: the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
and the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court rejected all of these claims, finding that such a 
challenge was not intended by the amendment. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, the 
115 Congressional Globe (391h Congress 151 Sess. 1866), 1292, as quoted in Berger, The 
Founders' Design. 159. 
116 Harry Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1908), supra note 6 at 81. 
117 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
Court held, was to prevent the enactment of laws discriminating against blacks, not to deal with 
labor and property questions. The claimants argued that the Fourteenth Amendment extended to 
all people by virtue of their national citizenship the guarantees of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, which meant that citizens could bring claims against the State based on those guarantees. 
This argument, if accepted, would have altered the relationship between the State and individual 
rights, setting up the federal government as the guarantor. The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause narrowly and holding that the 
language of the clause118 did not warrant the incorporation of such protections against the States. 
The clause, the Court held, only forbade States from infringing on "rights peculiar" to an 
individual's national citizenship, and did not serve as a guarantee of rights for the individual 
against the State.119 The Privileges and Immunities Clause continued to be narrowly construed, 
and never figured prominently in federalism adjudication. Finally, the Court found that the Due 
Process Clause was a strictly limited procedural guarantee, not a provision that could be read to 
contain specific rights.120 Although in The Slaughterhouse Cases the Court strictly construed the 
Due Process Clause, it would not long hold to this position. 
The rise of Substantive Due Process would radically alter the legal ramifications of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and have far-reaching effects on the relationship between the States and 
the nation, and on the role of the Court as arbiter of that relationship. The doctrine of 
Substantive Due Process maintained that the phrase "due process" not only contained procedural 
safeguards, but also secured unenumerated rights. These rights are bestowed on the citizens of 
the States by the Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause. As a result, the Fourteenth 
118 
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizen of the United States ... " 
119 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 126. 
12° Kelly et al., The American Constitution, 388. 
Amendment, with the Due Process Clause, would become and remain "the great engine of 
judicial power," expanding national prerogatives against the States.121 
The way was paved for the application of Substantive Due Process at the State level in 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana. In this case, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the term liberty in the 
Due Process Clause included a guarantee of "liberty of contract"-the right to make contracts for 
the acquisition of property. 122 From that point this doctrine of "liberty of contract" allowed the 
Court in cases like Lochner v. New York123 to find state laws and regulations unconstitutional, 
not on the basis of an explicit textual provision, but because the laws violated the notion of 
Substantive Due Process. The basis for these substantive prohibitions and the definition of 
"liberty of contract" were the justices' beliefs that the regulations in question were economically 
unsound and politically undesirable, and thus, that the Due Process Clause must extend a 
prohibition against the States regulating certain aspects of business and industry. 
In many ways, it is difficult to characterize the Court's federalism jurisprudence during 
the first three decades of the twentieth-century. The rise of Substantive Due Process meant that 
the Court's decisions were often based on ideas of "reasonableness," an inherently arbitrary 
concept grounded in each individual's conception of what was a "reasonable" law. 
Throughout the period from 1900 to 1933 the Court drew the line against social 
and economic legislation that seemed to alter market and property relationships 
too drastically. Often the Court's nay-saying was unexpected, disregarding what 
appeared to be controlling precedents in support of regulatory legislation ... it 
expressed the reluctance of the society as a whole to move too rapidly toward 
positive government and the regulatory state.124 
121 Bork, Tempting of America, 36. 
122 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897). 
123 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). "Liberty of contract" was applied against federal 
law in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 ( 1908). 
124 Kelly et al., The American Constitution, 446. 
The Court would swing from opposing federal and state legislation to upholding it, often while 
composed of the same members. 125 
During this time, the Court also began interpret Bill of Rights' provisions more 
expansively. In Git/ow v. New York (1925), 126 the Court affinned that the First Amendment's 
freedom of speech and press did indeed apply to the States, incorporated by way of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.127 The fact that such incorporation was assumed 
by the Court without any discussion of precedent or the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
hinted at a potential sea change in judicial understanding of the Bill of Rights. "For present 
purposes," opined Justice Sanford in Git/ow, ''we may and do assume that freedom of speech and 
of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are 
among the fundamental personal rights and 1Iiberties' protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impainnent by the States." 128 
In the late 1800s, the Progressive movement swept through America. The primary goal 
of the movement was to "introduce a more expansive understanding of national power, 
particularly with respect to interstate commerce."129 Progressives believed that "the expansion 
of governmental authority for regulatory purposes required the fonnulation of new doctrines of 
125 Examples oflaws upheld include Holding v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Muller v. Oregon, 
208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Examples of laws struck down 
include Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); 
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Wolff Packing Company v. Kansas Court of Industrial 
Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). 
126 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
127 Ten years later, the Court argued that the incorporation of the freedoms of speech and press 
inherently affirmed the incorporation of freedom of assembly. Grosjean v. American Press 
Company, 297 U.S. 233 (1936); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
128 Ibid., 666. 
129 Martha Derthick and John J. Dinan, "Progressivism and Federalism," in Progressivism and 
the New Democracy, ed. Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1999), 85. 
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constitutional power, especially at the federal level"; specifically, they desired a broader 
conception of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 130 Indeed, they argued that the 
notion of dual sovereignty and placing limitations on Congress's power through strict 
construction of the Commerce Clause was "outdated." 131 The Court did not wholeheartedly 
acquiesce to these desires to expand the Commerce Clause; sometimes it would uphold laws, and 
other times it would strike them down, again with a certain level of unpredictability. 132 Congress 
continued passing legislation that amounted to the assumption of a federal police power, 
ostensibly under the power to regulate interstate commerce granted to it by the Commerce· 
Clause.133 Nevertheless, generally the Court limited the national government's power to regulate 
the States and intrastate matters by opposing the more drastic federal economic regulations and 
advocating a laissez-faire economic theory. It was at the same time, however, laying the 
13° Kelly et al., The American Constitution, 416.; Theodore Roosevelt, a leader of the 
Progressives, argued that, "[Under a] wise and farseeing interpretation of the interstate 
commerce clause the national government should have complete power to deal with all of this 
wealth which in any way goes into the commerce between the States." Theodore Roosevelt, 
"State and Federal Powers," Address delivered at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 4 October 1906, 
reprinted in Selected Articles on States Rights, ed. Lamar T. Beman (New York: H. W. Wilson, 
1926), 148-158. 
131 Derthick and Dinan, "Progressivism and Federalism," 86. 
132 Thus, the Court's record on the Commerce Clause in the period between 1900 and 1933 is 
mixed. Federal regulations were upheld in cases that included: Railroad Commission of 
Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, 257 U.S 563 (1922); Dayton-Goose Creek 
Railway Company v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 
(1922); Federal laws were struck down in United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895); First 
Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, 259 U.S. 20 (1920). It should be noted that in E.C. Knight 
the Court made a distinction between commerce and "manufacturing," holding that the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act was constitutional where it dealt with the former, but that it did not and could not 
interfere with manufacturing. 
133 Kelly et al., The American Constitution, 417. 
groundwork for the ever-expanding power of the federal judiciary over the States by legitimating 
the idea of Substantive Due Process.134 
The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 and the introduction of his New Deal 
program were the harbingers of a new constitutional era and a new era for federalism. The 
central tenet of the New Deal was a massive conglomeration of power at the national level never 
before seen; the government justified this expansion of power with the Commerce Clause. 
Although the Supreme Court had accepted some federal laws that expanded the Commerce 
Clause during the preceding three decades, none of these were of the scope or magnitude 
proposed by the New Deal. This legislation required a new and much in.ore expansive 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, which the Court was loath to accept. Between 1933 and 
1936, the Court struck down at least a dozen New Deal laws.135 In the combined cases Amazon 
Petroleum Company v. Ryan and Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, the Court found that 
section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act was an unlawful delegation of Congress's 
authority to the president.136 In Perry v. United States/37 the Court struck down the Emergency 
Banking Relief Act of 1933 on the grounds that it overextended Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause. In Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., the Court invalidated the 
Railway Workers' Pension Act on the same grounds.138 
While each of these cases in their tum did little to help the relationship between 
Roosevelt and the Court, the 1936 case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States did the most 
134 Ibid., 443. 
135 Marian C. McKenna, Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional War: The Court-
Pacldng Crisis of 1937 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 27. 
136 Panama Refining Company et al. v. Ryan et al .• 293 U.S. 388 (1934). 
137 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 ( 1935). 
138 Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
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damage to this already contentious relationship.139 In Schechter, the Court overturned the 
National Industrial Recovery Act because the justices rejected the argument that one could not 
differentiate between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce; indeed, if such 
differentiation was not made then "the federal authority would embrace practically all the 
activities of the people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only 
by sufferance of the federal government."140 The Court expressed concern that to accept a broad 
"effects doctrine" that allowed for indirect effects as a justification of congressional power 
allowed for an imprecision which would justify many congressional actions that were not part of 
the original scope by the Commerce Clause. The opinion harkened back to the limits Chief 
Justice Marshall set out in his Gibbons opinion; in both cases, the Court argued that the 
maintenance of a distinct notion of interstate commerce, thus constraining the breadth of 
Congress's power, was ''fundamental" and "central to the maintenance of our constitutional 
system."141 Roosevelt was continually frustrated on all sides by the onslaught of Supreme Court 
rulings, and he constantly feared for the survival of legislation that had as yet escaped the 
Court's reach.142 For Roosevelt, the choice was clear-in order to preserve the New Deal, he 
must remake the Court in his favor. 
After his reelection in 1936, Roosevelt forged ahead with a plan to pack the Court. He 
presented a bill in Congress that would allow the Court's membership to be increased to fifteen 
justices, with the president being able to appoint a new justice for every judge over age seventy 
139 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
140 Ibid., 546. 
141 Ibid., 546. 
142 Bork, The Tempting of America, 51-53. These included the National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1932, the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 
who had served for ten years or more.143 In retrospect, it seems that Roosevelt's plan was 
doomed to fail from the start, as the effort was remarkably maladroit; Roosevelt neither followed 
the traditional channels of bill introduction, nor did he try to veil the baldly political reasoning 
for the bill. 144 Indeed, even those who supported Roosevelt's New Deal were not particularly 
enthusiastic about his announcement to enlarge the Court's membership, thus allowing him the 
freedom to add judicial nominees who favored his policies.145 Opposition to the bill was so 
strong that it was never brought to a vote.146 Nevertheless, while this plan may have failed 
spectacularly, the reform that Roosevelt sought still came. In 1937, the Supreme Court 
dramatically changed course with "the switch in time that saved nine", arguably under pressure 
from Roosevelt's plan, with the case West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, in which the Court upheld a 
congressional law establishing a minimum wage. 147 In West Coast Hotel, the justices 
demonstrated a new willingness to accept an expansive congressional commercial power. This, 
combined with the serendipitous deaths and retirements of several justices that allowed 
Roosevelt to select appointees favorable to New Deal policies, ushered in a radically new 
Supreme Court, willing to go much farther in its acceptance of national power. 148 
143 Barbara A. Perry and Henry J. Abraham, "Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court: A New 
Deal and a New Image," in Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court, 
ed. Stephen K. Shaw, William D. Pederson, and Frank J. Williams (Armonk, New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2004), 15. The bill also required the Court to give notice to the attorney general before it 
issued injunctions on constitutional questions; it allowed the Chief Justice power to shift district 
and circuit judges depending on the work load, and it "provided for direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court of any decision against an act of Congress by a court of first instance," 482-483. 
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Part of the new Court's acceptance of New Deal programs was based on the idea that the 
justices should show restraint and allow the other branches to interpret more expansively their 
powers. 149 Justice Frankfurter, appointed to the Court in 1939, exemplified this philosophy, 
arguing that 
one of the greatest duties of a judge [is] the duty not to enlarge his authority. That 
the Court is not a maker of policy but is concerned solely with questions of 
ultimate power, is a tenet to which all Justices have subscribed. But the extent to 
which they have translated faith into works probably marks the deepest cleavage 
among the men who have sat on the Supreme Bench.150 
The notion that judges should not apply a stringent effects doctrine and assume that 
congressional legislation was justified, only striking down laws if they "unambiguously 
violated the Constitution," came to be the guiding belief of the post-1937 Court.151 The 
result of this jurisprudence was greatly expanded congressional prerogatives, at the 
expense of States' power. 
The Court followed this doctrine of judicial restraint towards congressional legislation 
throughout the 1940s, during which time the justices allowed for the dramatic extension of 
national power beyond what had previously been considered constitutionally allowable under the 
Commerce Clause. In NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937), the Court 
discarded the theretofore recognized distinction between local manufacturing and interstate 
commerce, upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which allowed the national 
government to intervene in labor-management disputes because they arguably could affect the 
149 Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: _The Road to Modern Judicial 
Conservatism, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 24. 
15° Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1937), 80-81. 
151 Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court, 25. 
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flow of interstate commerce.152 In United States v. Darby (1941 ), which upheld the Fair Labor 
Standards Act allowing the national government sweeping powers to regulate wages, hours, and 
type of permitted labor based on the fact that such things could potentially affect interstate 
commerce, Chief Justice Stone wrote regarding the Tenth Amendment: 
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was 
more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and State 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the 
Amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay the fears that the new 
national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the 
States might not be able to exercise fully their reserved power. 153 
He continued, "The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for 
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the ... courts are given no control." 154 This 
is a telling example of the post-1937 Court's changed attitude with regard to federalism. No 
longer, as in Schechter, was the Court questioning if the national government could involve itself 
in States' concerns; rather, the question became simply one of the extent of allowable 
involvement. 
On the heels of this decision came the 1942 opinion in Wickard v. Filburn. 155 As 
discussed above, the Court in Wickard conceded that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, 
could regulate local production of wheat on private farms because such action in aggregate could 
have an effect on interstate commerce. The opinion was stunning in its breadth, especially in 
light of how unconstitutional it would have been considered only a few years before. The chief 
principle of Wickard was that the effects doctrine was largely without limits-if Congress could 
link an action, however tenuously or theoretically, to interstate commerce, the Supreme Court 
152 NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
153 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
I 54 Ibid., 115. 
155 Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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would be unlikely to object. This was a fundamental alteration of the principles of federalism 
adjudication that had prevailed in the Court's decisions prior to 1937. Again, this illustrated a 
shift at the most basic level of the position of the Court towards questions of federalism: the 
expansion of the power of the national government was accepted, and questions only turned on 
the legitimacy of the degree of that involvement. 
At the same time that the Court was limiting judicial review under the Commerce Clause, 
allowing Congress greatly expanded legislative flexibility, it began insisting that there were 
certain cases in which the presence of"discrete and insular minorities" represented a special 
interest that required much greater involvement on the part of the federal judiciary in State 
matters. 156 This new willingness on the part of the Court to involve itself in the States was seen 
in the case of Palko v. Connecticut. Palko demonstrated the inherent arbitrariness of the nascent 
incorporation doctrine assumed as fact in Gitlow.157 In Palko, the Court held that double 
jeopardy, prohibited under the Fifth Amendment, was not among the rights applied to the States 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's reasoning was that some of the rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights were more fundamental than others, and that the Due Process Clause only 
applied the "more fundamental" rights to the States. Thus, the freedom of speech contained in 
the First Amendment was protected because in the Court's estimation it was part of the 
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions,"158 whereas the right to trial by jury or indeed, the prohibition against double 
156 United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 (1938). 
157 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
158 Ibid., 328. 
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jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment, were "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered 
liberty."159 
That Palko accepted the Git/ow assumption that incorporated the First Amendment, but 
refused to incorporate the Fifth Amendment, was indicative of the Court's general confusion and 
lack of principle regarding incorporation doctrine. Throughout the 1940s there was an almost 
constant debate about whether other segments of the Bill of Rights, originally intended to apply 
only to the national government, should be extended by the Court through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to apply to the States. 160 The staunchest supporter ofincorporation of the Bill of 
Rights was Justice Hugo Black, who suggested that there had been " a current of opinion ... that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make secure against State invasion all the rights, 
privileges and immunities protected from federal violation by the Bill ofRights."161 Black 
argued that the Court had ignored this fact in "an effort to expand its own power," expanding and 
contracting "constitutional standards" (in this case, the Fourteenth Amendment) in order to have 
them "conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized 
decency' and 'fundamental liberty and justice' ."162 While Frankfurter and other members of the 
Court disagreed with Black's all-inclusive conception of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 
arguing that to do so would allow for "excessive judicial interference," in cases like Adamson v. 
California they conceded certain portions could be applied to the States by the Fourteenth 
159 Ibid., 325. 
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law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall . 
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Amendment.163 Incorporation of portions of the Bill of Rights to the States fundamentally 
altered the role of the Supreme Court in its arbitration between State and federal spheres of· 
power. It granted the Court far more say in what a State could and could not do within its own 
borders. 
From the New Deal to Rehnquist 
Following the success of Roosevelt's New Deal revolution, the Court continued in much 
the same vein throughout the following decade. During this time period, the Court persisted in 
involving itself in State matters, and additional guarantees in the Bill of Rights were incorporated 
to the States, including the freedom to petition164 and the Free Exercise165 and Establishment166 
clauses. While incorporation certainly expanded the Court's involvement with the States 
throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, it was still hesitant to inject itself into matters that would 
come to define the imminent Warren Court's legacy; for example, in Colgrove v. Green167 the 
Court refused to invalidate a State apportionment statute, a decision that would be overturned by 
Baker v. Carr168 in 1962. 
The ascension of Earl Warren to the position of Chief Justice in 1953 would not only 
exacerbate the profound effects of incorporation on federalism, but also dramatically alter the 
role of the Supreme Court in American political life more generally. This was due to several 
elements of the Court's jurisprudence. One of these elements was the continued expansion of 
163 Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court, 34. 
164 Haguey. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
165 Cantwell v. Connecticut. 
166 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
167 Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
168 Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186 (1962). 
incorporation doctrine both before and during Warren's tenure. 169 Incorporation proceeded until 
the majority of the clauses in the Bill of Rights were applicable to the States. 170 The second 
major element of the Warren Court's jurisprudence that altered the relationship between the 
States and the nation, and between the Court and the States, was an ever-present willingness to 
utilize the doctrine of Substantive Due Process. The expansive definition that the Court gave to 
the Due Process Clause, and its eagerness to find new rights within that definition, transformed 
federalism. 
The Warren Court involved itself in many federalism issues by way of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, handing down opinions regulating State electoral 
processes and State policies on obscenity. 171 Perhaps the most well known decision of the Court 
under Warren is Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, in which the justices unanimously 
found that the standard of separate-but-equal for racially segregated schools was unacceptable 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.172 Chief Justice Warren's opinion noted that "education is 
perhaps the most important function of State and local govemments."173 This responsibility w~ 
so important, and the current state of things so egregious, the Court suggested, that the States 
could not be trusted to fulfill adequately their responsibilities in an acceptable manner. State 
doctrines of"separate but equal" deprived individuals of the equal protection of the laws that 
169 This included the Establishment Clause, the rights of petition and assembly, the right to legal 
counsel, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S-. 335 (1963); 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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172 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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was guaranteed to citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Brown decision elevated the 
federal govenunent above the States in a policy area that had previously been under the States' 
control. 
In Brown v. Board of Education II, the Court extended its ruling from the original Brown, 
mandating that States desegregate schools ''with all deliberate speed."174 The cases brought 
under Brown were remanded to the originating courts, whose judges were given the 
responsibility by the Supreme Court to develop remedies for based on the new ruling of 
unconstitutionality. Based on the doctrine of "all deliberate speed", the Court decided Green v. 
New Kent County School Board, which "changed the constitutional mandate from a prohibition 
to a requirement of racial discrimination in school assignment."175 The system for integration in 
New Kent County, Virginia, the school district in question, was based on a non-racialized plan 
for intermixing. Since disparate proportions of black and white children still attended the two 
schools in the county, the Court held that the plan was unconstitutional, not under Brown, but 
under Brown II. The Court, in essence, made this decision based on the fact that the majority of 
justices felt that it was not doing enough; the way the Court felt that the district could make such 
intermixing happen appropriately was to choose individuals based on their race for inclusion in 
either school; they applied this kind of reasoning in other school segregation cases as well. 176 
174 Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294, 497 (1955); Goss v. Board of Education of 
Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 375 U.S. 391 (1964); United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F. 2d 
836 (1966); United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969); 
Bradley v. School Board City of Richmond, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
175 Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 67.; Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 
430 (1968). 
176 United States v. Montgomery Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). 
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State laws were also at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). 177 Griswold and another 
director, both employed by the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, were convicted 
under a State law that forbade the distribution of information regarding contraception to married 
couples; the conviction was appealed on the grounds that the law violated a constitutional 
protection of marital privacy. In the opinion, Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for the 
majority of the Court, declared the constitutional protection of a heretofore unrecognized right-
the right to privacy. Douglas suggested that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations" which proved the existence of the unwritten ri.ght. 178 As a 
result, States could not make laws regarding married couples access to contraception because 
these individuals possessed a right to privacy as citizens of the United States. This reasoning 
was an outgrowth of the Substantive Due Process doctrine; the justices could now declare new 
rights based on a generalized constitutional principle as opposed to an explicitly textual basis. 
The constitutionality of the behavior of State authorities was the question raised in the 
case of Miranda v. Arizona.179 In this case, the Warren Court was asked to decide whether State 
police practices of interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment if the authorities did not inform 
the individuals of their rights. In the group of cases that were brought under Miranda, authorities 
had obtained confessions from individuals without providing such information. Chief Justice 
Warren wrote the opinion of the Court, which found that failing to inform suspects of their rights 
violated their right to protection from self-incrimination, and thus the Fifth Amendment. It was 
unconstitutional, the Court held, to not inform the accused of their rights; in fact, the Court listed 
specific guarantees, including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney, that it felt 
177 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381U.S.479 (1965). 
178 Ibid., 515. 
179 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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police were constitutionally obligated to follow. After the Miranda ruling, any confession 
obtained by State and local police without following the specific guidelines laid out in the 
opinion became constitutionally inadmissible. 
While many lauded the Warren Court for advancing the civil liberties movement through 
decisions like Brown, Griswold, and Miranda, and certainly even more felt concern over such 
situations, like segregation, which the Court sought to address, there existed a concern about the 
constitutional implications of the loose or non-existent textual basis of the Court's decisions. 
The extension of the incorporation doctrine and the recognition of new rights as a result of 
Substantive Due Process elevated national prerogatives above those of the States to a degree 
never before seen. Writing in dissent in Reynolds v. Sims, Justice John Marshall Harlan opined: 
These decisions ... cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism ... No thinking 
person can fail to recognize that the aftermath of these cases, however desirable it 
may be thought in itself, will have been achieved at the cost of a radical alteration 
in the relationship between the States and the Federal Government, more 
particularly the Federal Judiciary. Only one who has an overbearing impatience 
with the federal system and its political processes will believe that that cost was 
not too high or was inevitable ... These decisions give support to a current 
mistaken view ... that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in 
some constitutional "principle," and that this Court should "take the lead" in 
promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act . .. The 
Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise 
that in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this 
Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court, limited in function in 
accordance with that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its 
authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the 
political process ... when ... the Court adds something to the Constitution that was 
deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view of what 
should be so for the amending process. 180 
Indeed, one of the many constitutional legacies of the Warren Court was the creation of a vastly 
different set of means by which to approach the relationship between the States and national 
powers. Decisions like Brown, Griswold, and Miranda made great inroads against traditional 
180 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-625 (1964). 
notions of federalism, ultimately with the Court taking over State legislative powers in the areas 
of racial equality, privacy, and criminal rights. 
When President Richard Nixon nominated Judge Warren Burger to become the chief 
justice in June 1969, Burger inherited a Court with vastly new territory before it as a result of 
incorporation and the rise of the right to privacy.181 In its first few years, the Burger Court 
showed some hesitation in endorsing and extending Warren Court precedents, although it did so 
in some cases. 182 "The new Justices," one scholar said, "have been forced to choose between 
their political conservatism, which urges wholesale reversal of Warren Court policy, and their 
judicial conservatism, which counsels reliance upon established precedent."183 The Burger 
Court, for the most part, came to choose the second option. For example, the Court built on the 
precedent of Griswold in the case of Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which a six-justice majority found 
that State laws preventing the distribution of information about contraceptives to single 
individuals was unconstitutional. 184 The Court extended the right to privacy because, as the 
majority accepted the argument in Griswold, it could not find any rational basis in the Fourteenth 
Amendment for differentiating between married and single individuals. This perpetuation of a 
constitutional principle based on Substantive Due Process only served to further diminish the 
States' jurisdiction. 
181 Henry Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Appointments from Washington to Clinton (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1999), 253. , 
182 Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) "represented ... a blunting of the Warren Court's thrust 
in the area ofrace relations"; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) "enunciated the rule 
that, where the classification is nonracial, only those interest guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
merit strict scrutiny, interests of an economic or social nature do not"; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 
U.S. 112 (1970) and Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) affirmed Warren Court 
State electoral decisions; in Richard Y. Funston, Constitutional Counterrevolution?, (New York: 
Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1977), 328-331. 
183 Funston, Constitutional Counterrevolution?, 339. 
184 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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The Burger Court decision that had perhaps the most far-reaching effect on restricting the 
sphere of State power was the case of Roe v. Wade, which again built on the concept of a right to 
privacy. 185 The case was brought as a challenge to a Texas abortion statute that prohibited 
abortions except to save the mother's life. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the now-
established constitutional right to privacy encompassed the right of a woman to have an abortion, 
and that the Texas law was, as a result, unconstitutional. In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that 
the law was, indeed, unconstitutional. Furthermore, since the ruling found that there was a 
constitutional right to abortion (althou&h the opinion prescribed different limits for the three 
trimesters), the laws of 46 States were affected by the ruling.186 
While the Burger Court accepted the broad extension of the right to privacy over 
reproductive matters, they were less willing to accept its extension in other areas. This was 
particularly true when it came to the issue of homosexual conduct. In the case Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the Court found that the Constitution did not contain a right for individuals to engage 
in homosexual sodomy, and that State laws prohibiting such behavior were within the bounds of 
constitutionality.187 While the Court accepted the right to privacy as a limiting factor on State 
legislation in cases like Roe, Bowers demonstrated that the justices did not accept privacy 
without limits; however, the distinction they drew between the two cases was not based on the 
constitutional text. The Court simply argued that in Roe, the Constitution could be read to 
contain a right to abortion, while in Bowers it could not be read to contain a right to homosexual 
sodomy. There was no explanation offered for the presence of one right and not the other 
besides the justices' own perceptions of fundamental rights. Bowers confirmed the inherent 
185 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
186 Jerry Goldman, Roe v. Wade (Oyez: The Oyez Project, 2005.) [Online] available from 
http://www.oyez.org/oye:zJresource/case/334/; accessed 21 March 2005; Internet. 
187 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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arbitrariness of the doctrine that the Court was using to expand federal prerogatives and restrict 
States' powers. 
The Burger Court also continued deciding in school desegregation cases where the 
Warren Court had left off. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education188 and Davis 
v. School Commissioners of Mobile County,189 the Court, in the tradition of Brown II and Green, 
unanimously decided that racial integration meant racial balance, and districts would have to bus 
students cross-district to achieve this marker of desegregation. This required many districts to 
revamp their integration programs, and some districts that had no busing were required to find 
the capital to acquire and start such a program. 190 The difficulty with such decisions, on the 
constitutional level, was that every decision had to be considered by the judiciary on an ad hoc 
basis, because the overarching principles were nebulous at best; not only that, but decisions 
about local and State functions came more and more within the purview of the federal judiciary, 
not those directly responsible for the programs.191 These cases represented a further 
appropriation of discretionary and regulatory power by the federal government and judiciary at 
the expense of state prerogatives. 
When William H. Rehnquist was sworn into office in early 1972, he arrived after the 
most dramatic remaking of the Court's role in the twentieth century. With the long and 
convoluted history of federalism that lay behind, it still remained uncertain as to where the Court 
would go next when it came to States' rights. What role Justice Rehnquist would have in 
188 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
189 Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971). 
190 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, 142. 
191 Ibid., 145.; Richmond School Board v. Board of Education, 412 U.S. 92 (1973); Wright v. 
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Board of 
Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). 
shaping the Court's role in regards to federalism would prove to be of great significance. 
Chapter Three 
Rehnquist, the Rehnquist Court, and Federalism 
On January 7, 1972, William H. Rehnquist was sworn in as the 1041h member of the 
United States Supreme Court.192 He would serve as an associate justice for fourteen and a half 
years before being elevated to the chief justiceship. During his tenure as an associate justice he 
displayed in his opinions, and especially in his dissents, a strong commitment to principles of 
federalism. This commitment continued to inform his understanding of cases and constitutional 
provisions once he ascended to the position of Chief Justice. hldeed, the echoes and 
repercussions of these early commitments constitute what some see as the most striking and 
controversial legacy of the Rehnquist Court. 
As has been argued, federalism has been perhaps the most enduring theme of American 
constitutional life, from the time of the Founding, through the Civil War and New Deal, and 
down to the present. The centrality of the debates over the nature and extent of the federal 
structure of the constitutional order hardly began with the advent of Rehnquist as a Supreme 
Court justice, nor will it end with the conclusion of his tenure in the center chair. Yet an analysis 
of his personal commitment to those fundamental principles of sovereignty as divided between. 
nation and States is essential to understanding the important ideological role federalism has 
played in his jurisprudence of judicial restraint for over three decades; so, too, is it essential to 
understanding his later intellectual leadership as Chief Justice during which time the effort to 
restore federalism to its central constitutional place has become the focus of public debate about 
the role of the federal judiciary more generally. In order to explore thoroughly whether what is 
192 Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators, 270. 
56 
underway is a true "federalism revolution."193, it is essential to have an understanding of the 
elements of the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence that Rehnquist brings with him to the 
chief justiceship concerning the Constitution, original intention, and State sovereignty. As Chief 
Justice, Rehnquist's understanding about the role of original intention in interpreting the 
Constitution, and what this means for the courts and Congress, are essential components of a 
complete picture ofboth his own and his Court's federalism jurisprudence. 
Constitutionalism, Originalism, and Federalism: Rehnquist's Early Years 
Rehnquist's understanding of the original design of the Constitution has been 
foundational to his understanding about the nature and extent of the judiciary under it and the 
role of the courts in arbitrating between the powers of the States and the powers of the nation. At 
the heart of this understanding is a stated interest in the original intentions of the Founders, 
which Rehnquist declares to be the basis for his understanding of the Constitution as it pertains 
to federalism. It is this constitutional understanding that grounds his approach to the questions 
and challenges of federalism and which has largely defined his judicial career.194 
Between 1972 and 1986, when he served as an associate justice, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed a number of federalism issues. In case after case where problems of 
State sovereignty were at issue, Rehnquist wrote both majoiity opinions and dissents, all of 
which contribute to a better understanding of the specific tenets of his own notions of federalism 
that have become so contested during his chief justiceship. The themes that emerge in his 
opinions in federalism cases prior to 1986 in many ways foreshadow the focus and direction of 
the Court in regard to federalism under his later leadership. 
193 Fallon, "Conservative Paths," 430. 
194 McDowell, "Language and the Limits of Judging," 244. 
At the heart ofRehnquist's commitment to federalism is not merely an implicit 
assumption but an explicit declaration that there is a principled, constitutionally mandated way to 
deal with questions regarding where to draw the line between national power and State 
sovereignty. He believes that since "the Constitution and the laws embody the intentions of 
those who wrote and ratified them, judges are morally obligated to defer to those intentions by 
the principle of popular government; similarly, they are constitutionally obligated to defer to 
those intentions by the principle of limited government secured by the written law."195 In almost 
every case, Rehnquist connects his notions of the relationship between the nation and the States 
to constitutional history and the intentions of the Founders. For him, the principle of federalism, 
properly understood, is as it was, defined in the Constitution and by the Founders' original 
meaning. 
Rehnquist's understanding of the Constitution as a fundamental law of limited and 
enumerated powers is crucial to grasping his arguments and ideas concerning questions of 
federalism. Not only does he resist the notion that one can impart extra-textual meaning into 
constitutional clauses, he also has been a proponent of the idea that each clause has a specific and 
knowable meaning. It has been this significance of the constitutional text that he declared 
required emphasis when weighing the interests of the States and the nation. 
Adhering to constitutional text, Rehnquist believes, is what gives a Court's decisions 
legitimacy. Rooting judicial decisions in the Constitution's language also prevents the Court 
from overstepping its boundaries in relation to the States and in its function as a co-equal branch 
of the federal government. fu one case, for example, Rehnquist poetically refers to the 
"constitutional shoals" which he argues "confront any attempt0 on the part of the judiciary to 
195 Ibid. 
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impart rights, privileges, and liberties to the Constitution that are not found in the text.196 Indeed, 
the distinction that Rehnquist draws suggests in no uncertain terms that rights, liberties, and 
privileges that are socially popular cannot simply be judicially transferred wholesale into the 
Constitution based on this popularity-they must enjoy clear textual support in the original 
Constitution itself or be put there by subsequent amendment. The text of the Constitution has a 
determinable meaning and is not merely an empty vessel. 
For Rehnquist, the meaning of the Constitution as it pertains to federalism is not based 
merely on the idea that the letter of the text defines the meaning of written law. 197 He believes 
that correctly understanding the Constitution requires not only an accurate reading of the text, 
but a well developed understanding of the intentions of the Founders and ratifiers who framed 
and adopted that text. In his view, it is not enough to understand that the Constitution's language 
itself dictates certain limits to State or national powers on its face; the original intention or 
meaning is also essential to a correct understanding of the constitutional provision at issue. 
Rehnquist's constitutionalism is rooted in his belief that it is "impossible to build sound 
constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history."198 He generally 
adheres to this idea throughout his opinions, noting the original reasons for adopting particular 
constitutional language and arguing that this language has to be interpreted in light of the 
meaning that it had when it was first enacted. The persistent and pervasive theme of his 
constitutional jurisprudence is that "the Framers inscribed common principles that control today. 
196 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 693 (1976). 
197 Unlike, for example, the more strictly textualist notions of Justice Antonin Scalia, which 
focus solely on the text. See: Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
198 Wallace v. Jaffree, 92. 
Any deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that charter and will only lead 
to ... unprincipled decisionmaking."199 
Court: 
For him, the Constitution and its language mean very specific things for judges on the 
Any document-particularly a constitution-is built on certain postulates or 
assumptions; it draws on shared experience and common understanding. On a 
certain level, that observation is obvious. Concepts such as "State" and "Bill of 
Attainder" are not defined in the Constitution and demand external referents. But 
on a more subtle plane, when the Constitution is ambiguous or silent on a 
particular issue, this Court has often relied on notions of a constitutional plan-
the implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to make 
the Constitution a workable governing charter and to give each provision within 
that document the full effect intended by the Framers. The tacit postulates yielded 
by that ordering are as much engrained in the fabric of the document as its express 
provisions, because without them the Constitution is denied force and often 
meaning .... The Court's literalism, therefore, cannot be dispositive ... and we 
must examine further the understanding of the Framers and the consequent 
doctrinal evolution of concepts of State sovereignty.200 
For example, this understanding is the reason that Rehnquist is usually hesitant to accept 
challenges under Section 1983 of the United States Code.201 In such cases, he rejects the idea 
199 Ibid., 113. 
200 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433-434 (1979). 
201 Section 1983 of the U.S. Civil Code provides for civil action for deprivation of rights : 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia." 
that the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Court to apply Section 1983 to State cases.202 It 
seems to him absurd that the "Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause should ex proprio 
vigore extend ... a right to be free of injury wherever the State may be characterized as the 
tortfeasor", if for no other reason than such reasoning could allow any action by a State actor to 
be challenged in federal court, which was clearly not the purpose of the Amendment.203 In 
Rehnquist's view, broadening the jurisdiction of the Court and the scope of the Constitution in 
this way is untenable. His resistance to a wide expansion of the Court's power based on a loose 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment also explains his resistance to the concept of Substantive 
Due Process; he rejects the idea that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides a guarantee of substantive, albeit unenumerated, rights, and is not simply a procedural 
safeguard. 
While Rehnquist does not completely reject certain notions of rights protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he clearly delineates the specific rights that he believes are explicitly 
protected by text and intention. Indeed, he argues that neither those who adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, nor prior Court precedent, allows for any sort of loose conception of due process 
rights to bind the States.204 He is reluctant to constitutionalize rights that were previously not 
202 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 
454 U.S. 100 (1981). 
The most pertinent sections of the Fourteenth Amendment are Sections 1 and 5, which read 
respectively: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or inununities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article. 
203 Ibid., 693. 
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included in the Constitution, and which are not explicitly to be found in its text. "The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of liberty. It protects only against 
deprivations of liberty accomplished 'without due process oflaw'," he argues.205 
Another major area in which Rehnquist has resisted expansionist tendencies is under the 
Commerce Clause. He recognizes that the Commerce Clause legitimately allows Congress 
certain spheres of influence; however, he opposes the expansion of these spheres beyond the 
limits of a reasonable definition of commerce, and he strongly opposes the use of the Commerce 
Clause as an engine for extending the authority of the judiciary. 206 He suggests that, just as is the 
case with substantive due process, using the Commerce Clause as a means to expand judicial 
power requires an illegitimate interpretation of the text and intention of the clause.207 
Furthermore, he questions the. extent to which the language of the clause can be broadened to 
allow Congress to act.208 
Rehnquist's reasoning in Commerce Clause cases uniformly relies upon his principles of 
federalism and his constitutionalism rooted in the authority of original meaning. This is not to 
say that he does not believe Congress's power through the Commerce Clause cannot be 
expanded at all. An amendment to the Constitution can legitimately alter the meaning of the 
text; however, the Court cannot appropriate for itself Congress' legislative role and 
independently declare a new meaning for the text. Rehnquist does not accept the notion that 
205 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). 
206 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981 ). 
207 The Commerce Clause is found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, which 
States that: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, 
to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; 
but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ... To regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." 
208 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976). 
justices can find additional constitutional principles and implications in words that have never 
been understood to have these extra meanings; to do so, he believes, is overstepping the 
boundaries established for the role of a judge. 
For Rehnquist, the argument for congressional authority and the authority of the Court is 
based on a strict set of circumstances explicitly prescribed in the text of the Constitution. For 
example, Rehnquist concedes that the Fourteenth Amendment certainly expands Congress's 
power, and that Section 5 of the amendment limits the Eleventh Amendment.209 He bases this 
belief on both the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the intention of those who adopted it.210 
On the same basic premise, Rehnquist rejects the claim that federal courts may presume that 
constitutional provisions abridge the immunity granted to the States by the Eleventh 
Amendment, and therefore use the Commerce Clause to justify an expansion of the federal 
government into State affairs.211 In this way, the language of the Constitution limits 
congressional power, just as the Court's power is also limited. 
Rehnquist's.philosophy of federalism resists the broadening of principles that will allow 
for overbroad national involvement and control of State affairs or an over-extended reach of the 
federal judiciary into State matters. This resistance is rooted in his belief that fundamental 
notions of comity, a mutual respect between sovereign entities, should control the relationship 
between the national government and the State governments.212 He accepts the notion of 
209 The Eleventh Amendment States "The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted aga:inst one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'' 
210 The particularly relevant section of the Fourteenth Amendment is Section 5, which reads, 
''The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article." 
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212 Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary,103,112 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37 (1971), at 44). 
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.. sovereign immunity .. of States as an integral part of the fedeqllist system created by the 
Constitution,213 and considers "the fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and 
State governments" as "essential to 'Our Federalism. "'214 Furthermore, this same sort of 
principle makes him hesitant to expand judicial power beyond the specific limits allowed by 
those federal laws that do apply to the States. 
Rehnquist stresses the independent nature of State courts and the limited capacity of the 
federal judiciary to interfere with the ability of States to grant relief to their citizens. He urges a 
"proper regard for the relationship between the independent State and federal judiciary 
systems".215 To his way of thinking, this process is "consistent with the concepts of 
federalism."216 His argument turns on the notion that the State governments and their judiciaries 
should be given a wide, and indeed constitutionally protected, latitude to resolve State matters in 
their own way. He deplores intrusion into the function of State and local governments by the 
federal judiciary in a manner that he sees as inconsistent with these concepts; for example, 
rejecting the claim that the "scope_of federal equity power ... should be extended to the 
fashioning of prophylactic procedures for a State agency."217 Again, he rests this claim on the 
"principles of federalism" he finds in the Constitution.218 
A survey of Justice Rehnquist's majority opinions and dissents during his early years on 
the Court reveals a strong conviction about the essential role of constitutional text in arbitrating 
between national power and the sovereignty of the States. Moreover, it is clear that in his view 
constitutional language needs to be understood not simply on its face, but within the context of 
213 Ibid .• 433. 
214 Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 103. 
215 Steffel v. Thompson, 401 U.S. 66, 479 (1974). 
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the original intentions by which the textual provisions were framed and adopted. Rehnquist's 
federalism, then, is at its most basic level a constitutional principle rooted in the original 
understanding of the Constitution, intended by the Founders to be explicitly central to the 
political life and decision-making of the republic. Furthermore, the Court has to have a full 
understanding of these fundamentally intertwined notions of constitutionalism, originalism, and 
federalism, in order to appreciate and understand the intricacies of comity, and thus function 
appropriately in its role. During his years as associate justice, Rehnquist ''disappointed the hopes 
and fears of neither his nominator, nor his supporters. nor his opponents,•• becoming the "leader 
of the right, or conservative, wing of the Court ... frequently joined in general by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice O'Connor.''219 
The implications ofRehnquist's commitment to federalism, however, would not be fully 
realized until after he ascended to the Chief Justiceship. Understanding the way that Justice 
Rehnquist conceives of the constitutional relationship between national power and State 
sovereignty allows for a more complete understanding of the intellectual dynamics that have 
shaped the Court's federalism decisions since his promotion to the center chair in 1986. In 
decisions like Deshaney v. Winnebago County Social Services220, Gregory v. Ashcrofl221, New 
York v. United States222, United States v. Lopez223, City of Boerne v. Flores224, and Printz v. 
United States225, Alden v. Maine126, the Rehnquist Court has handed down opinions that have 
2 19 Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators, 270. 
220 Deshaney v. Winnebago County Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
221 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
222 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
223 United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
224 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
225 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
226 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
demonstrated a fundamental shift, apparently led by the Chief Justice, regarding the Court's 
approach to federalism. 
The Making of the Rehnquist Court 
President Reagan announced the nomination of Associate Justice Rehnquist for the 
position of chief justice in June 1986.227 After a somewhat bruising confirmation process, he 
was confirmed by the Senate on August 14th and took his place as Chief Justice with the other 
seven members of the court: Lewis F. Powell, Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., John 
Paul Stevens, Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White, Sandra Day O'Connor. They were soon 
joined by Antonin Scalia, who filled the ninth seat, the vacant associate justiceship left by 
Rehnquist.228 As a general rule, Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and White came down on the 
conservative side, while Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens predictably came down on 
the other. 229 The largely swing vote of Justice Powell, who was conservative on crime, but not 
much else, provided the necessary 5-vote majority for either side in many cases.230 Initially, this 
particular makeup made for a voting record not much different from the preceding Burger 
Court-"conservative on crime, but liberal on civil rights and civil liberties".231 
Several months after Rehnquist's confirmation, however, Justice Powell announced his 
intention to resign. The new appointment to fill his position had the potential fundamentally to 
227 Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators, 291. 
228 Ibid., 292; Kelly et al., The American Constitution, xxvi: 
229 David G. Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court, (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1992), 151. 
230 Ibid., 127.; Powell wrote the opinion in McC!eskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which 
rejected a statistical study regarding race disparities in death penalty cases as a support for the 
unconstitutionality of particular conviction. Powell was the fifth vote upholding Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and both concurred and dissented in the affirmative action case Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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affect the Court, consolidating a truly conservative five-vote majority. The confirmation of 
Reagan's initial nominee for the position, Judge Robert H. Bork, was defeated. The president's 
following nomination of Judge Douglas Ginsburg was also unsuccessful. 232 Eventually, the 
moderately conservative federal appeals judge, Anthony Kennedy, filled the position.233 
Arguably, the Court now had a reasonably solid conservative majority. 
In 1990, Justice William Brennan announced his retirement. President George H. W. 
Bush, wanting to avoid the confirmation difficulties that he had witnessed firsthand as Reagan's 
vice-president, nominated Judge David Souter who he considered to be moderate enough to 
make it through the confirmation process, but still conservative enough to be reasonably 
dependable.234 Souter, in fact, proved himself to be far less conservative than expected, and is 
one of the solidly liberal members of the Rehnquist Court, willing to interpret quite broadly the 
Court's power.235 A year later, Clarence Thomas was nominated to fill position of the retiring 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, and, despite a rocky confirmation process, took his place on the 
bench and has become one of the Court's members most strongly committed to judicial· 
restraint. 236 
The making of the Relmquist Court into its current form was almost complete. In 1993. 
President Bill Clinton nominated Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg after Justice Byron White 
announced his retirement. When Justice Harry Blackmun announced his decision to leave the 
Court in 1994, Judge Stephen G. Breyer filled the open position.237 Both justices were decidedly 
232 Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court, 164. 
233 Peter Irons, Brennan vs. Rehnquist: The Battle for the Constitution (New York: Alfred A 
Knopf, 1994), I 06. 
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I 
left-of-center, and generally aligned themselves with Justices Stevens and Souter.238 Rehnquist, 
Thomas, and Scalia were predictably to the conservative side of the majority of cases, while 
O'Connor and Kennedy also moved to the right, although less predictably. In this configuration, 
the Rehnquist Court would continue for more than a decade with no further appointments. 
Federalism Under the Rehnquist Court 
It certainly appeared to Court watchers that the Rehnquist Court was poised to enact a 
conservative revolution in the law. This was clearly disadvantageous in the eyes of some; those 
who feared a right-leaning Court were most concerned about issues of abortion rights and a more 
limited expansion of civil liberties. The federalism cases that have come before the Rehnquist 
Court can be divided into two categories, institutional federalism cases and rights-based 
federalism cases. 
Institutional federalism cases are those that deal primarily with the legislative power of 
Congress and its relationship to the States, while rights-based federalism cases are those that 
concerned individuals' civil rights claims against the States. Generally, in both types of cases 
Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia support State prerogatives and in the majority of 
institutional federalism cases, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy usually join them. It is these 
cases that constitute a federalism revival and have come to define the Rehnquist Court's legacy. 
In rights-based federalism cases, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are less reliable in their 
commitment to State sovereignty, and as a result, the federalism triumvirate of Rehnquist, Scalia, 
and Thomas rarely achieves their desired majority. While this institutional versus rights-based 
238 Ibid., 320. 
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split is not absolutely without exception, it does serve as a general rule for understanding the 
significant drifts from federalism doctrine that have occurred in certain cases. 
A. The Institutional Federalism Cases 
The first harbinger of the new federalism of the Rehnquist Court is the case of Deshaney 
v. Winnebago County Social Services239, in which Rehnquist writes the opinion for the six-justice 
majority including himself and Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Joshua 
DeShaney suffered physical violence at the hands of his father that left him permanently 
mentally handicapped. His mother sued the Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
alleging that the department had deprived the child of his "liberty interest in bodily integrity, in 
violation of his rights under the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause, by failing to intervene to protect him against his father's violence. "240 In the 
opinion, the Court rejects this· claim, holding that a State's failure to protect an individual against 
private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In his opinion, Rehnquist writes 
The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a 
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State 
itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without "due process of 
law," but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative 
obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through 
other means. Nor does history support such an expansive reading of the 
constitutional text.241 
239 Deshaney v. Winnebago County Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
240 Ibid., 189. 
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While the facts of the case are~ as Rehnquist notes, "undeniably tragic", the purpose of the Due 
Process Clause is to ''protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State [protects] 
them from each other. "242 He continues 
The Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the 
latter area to the democratic political processes ... The people of Wisconsin may 
well prefer a system of liability that would place upon the State and its officials 
the responsibility for failure to act in situations such as the present one. They may 
create such a system, if they do not have it already, by changing the tort law of the 
State in accordance with the regular lawmaking process. But they should not 
have it thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.243 
Deshaney v. Winnebago is the first major example of a Rehnquist Court decision that takes the 
more limited view of the Due Process Clause that has long been championed by Rehnquist. 
In Gregory v. Ashcroft244, two Missouri State judges challenged the State constitution's 
requirement that mandated State court judge retirement at age seventy, claiming as grounds the 
1967 Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. A seven-justice majority. which includes Rehnquist, White, 
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and O'Connor, rejects both of these claims, with Justice 
O'Connor writing the opinion. From the outset of her opinion, O'Connor insists that the 
constitutional arrangement between the States and the nation "establishes a system of dual 
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government. This Court also has recognized this 
fundamental principle."245 It is this arrangement, she argues---or more accurately, the tension 
within this arrangement-that guarantees the liberty and security of the people. 
242 Ibid., 196. 
243 Ibid., 196, 203. 
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The Court has already heard and accepted the validity of the ADEA under the Commerce 
Clause246; however, in this particular case allowing a congressional law to overturn the sovereign 
will of the people of Missouri "would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and State 
powers."247 Therefore, the ADEA cannot overwrite this portion of the State constitution; 
furthermore, even if it can, the judges do not fall under its jurisdiction because they are 
"appointees on the policymaking level."248 O'Connor notes that while the Court accepts the 
ADEA as a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, "the principles of 
federalism that constrain Congress' exercise of its Commerce Clause powers are attenuated when 
Congress acts pursuant to its powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments," and that the Court 
cannot assume that Congress intended for State court judges to be incl~ded under the ADEA.249 
While she suggests that the Equal Protection Clause has the potential to apply in this case, 
because of the nature of the law, she finds that it did not. 
Justices White and Stevens agree with the judgment but think Justice O'Connor's 
unwillingness to include State judges under the ADEA establishes a weak principle. 
The majority ... chooses not to resolve that issue of statutory construction. Instead, 
it holds that, whether or not the ADEA can fairly be read to exclude State judges 
from its scope, "[w]e will not read the ADEA to cover State judges unless 
Congress has made it clear that judges are included." ... I cannot agree with this 
"plain Statement" rule, because it is unsupported by the decisions upon which the 
majority relies, contrary to our Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, and 
fundamental I y unsound. 250 
Those who dissent believe this sort of jurisprudence places an undue burden on Congress, and 
that courts must be able to infer certain things from legal text. Additionally, Justfoes Marshall 
246 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
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and Blackmun disagree that judges are not included under the ADEA, "because appointed judges 
are not accountable to the official who appoints them and are precluded from working closely 
with that official once they have been appointed, they are not 1'appointee[s] on the policymaking 
level."251 Thus, a reasonable reading of the ADEA should allow for the inclusion of State 
judges. 
In New York v. United States252, the Court finds that one of the provisions of the Low~ 
Level Waste Act violates the Tenth Amendment, while it accepts two others. The act imposed 
"upon States, either alone or in 'regional compacts' with other States, the obligation to provide 
for the disposal of waste generated within their borders."253 Justice O'Connor again writes for 
the majority, stating that the constitutional question in this case is "as old as the Constitution: it 
consists of discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the 
States."254 O'Connor then presents a brief history of the Founding, citing the principles of 
federalism established then as central to the current case. She finds that Congress may use the 
powers at its disposal, including its spending and interstate commerce powers, to encourage 
States to comply with proposed regulations; however, she argues that 
the take-title provision offers state governments a "choice" of either accepting 
ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of 
Congress ... Either type of federal action would "commandeer" state governments 
into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would, for this reason, be 
inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state 
goverrunents. 255 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens concur in part and dissent in part from the 
majority. White, writing for the dissenters, affirms the parts of the act that the Court held up, but 
251 Ibid., 488. 
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disagrees with the reasoning for striking down the third provision. He argues that the act is much 
more a compact of"cooperative federalism'' then the majority acknowledges.256 Furthermore, he 
argues that in the past the Court has not looked with such strict scrutiny upon various actions of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
What is interesting about Gregory and New York is that in neither did the majority 
establish a fundamental rule regarding federalism as such. Rather, in each case the Court limits 
or strikes down in whole or in part a federal law without suggesting that this action has any 
broader implications for later adjudication between States' powers and the nation's authority. 
While both cases demonstrate a resistance on the part of the majority of the Court to a broad 
construction of congressional powers, neither decision accomplishes a fundamental shift in the 
balance of power between the States and the nation. Looking at these decisions, it is clear that 
the members of the Rehnquist Court most concerned with federa1ism, Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas, cannot carry a majority willing to deal with the most fundamental precedent cases that 
have expanded the federal and judicial role in federal-state relations. 
The Court certainly is unwilling to accept any and all federal incursions on State power, 
and the majority does continue to limit the ability of Congress to regulate within and among the 
States under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez257 the Court finds that the 1990 
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which forbade individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a 
school zone, is unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause. Joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
writes the opinion, suggesting that to understand the constitutionality of the case, one must start 
256 Ibid., 193. 
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with "first principles," that "the Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated 
powers."258 He agrees that 
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of 
Congress under that Clause. In part, this was a recognition of the great changes 
that had occurred in the way business was carried on in this country. Enterprises 
that had once been local or at most regional in nature had become national in 
scope. But the doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce 
Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce. 259 
However, "even these modem-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause confinn that this power is subject to outer limits. "260 What are these 
limits? There are three broad principles, Relmquist suggests. Congress "may regulate the use of 
the channels of interstate commerce;" it may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
come only from intrastate activities;" and it may regulate "those activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce."261 
Rehnquist insists that the Gun-Free School Zones Act does not fall under any of these 
categories. "Even Wickard," he argues, "which is perhaps the most far reaching example of 
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the 
possession of a gun in a school zone does not."262 While he concedes that Congress is not 
required to show expressly the way in which a particular thing under regulation affects interstate 
commerce, Rehnquist notes that when the effects are not readily apparent, such justification 
might be necessary to prevent the Supreme Court from finding such a law invalid. He rejects the 
258 Ibid., 552. 
259 Ibid 556 ., . 
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government's argument that "costs of crime" validates the exercise of their power, as such an 
argument could validate the national government intervening in anything remotely related to 
criminal problems. With this argument, Rehnquist contends, it is "difficult to perceive any 
limitation on federal power."263 
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, concur, stating 
The history of our Commerce Clause decisions contains at least two lessons of 
relevance to this case. The first, as Stated at the outset, is the imprecision of 
content-based boundaries used without more to define the limits of the Commerce 
Clause. The second, related to the first but of even greater consequence, is that the 
Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in 
the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this 
. 264 pomt. 
Justice Thomas also concurs, urging that the justices "observe that our case law has drifted far 
from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. In a future case, we ought to temper 
our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our more recent case 
law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause."265 Justice Breyer, joined 
by the four dissenters, argues that education could affect an individuals place in the economy, the 
overall economy, and thus commerce, and while this is not given as a stated justification for the 
Gun-Free School Zone Act, it nevertheless justifies it. 
Lopez illustrates a fundamental difference between the members of the majority and 
those who dissent in such cases. It is clear that many of the jurisprudential differences tum on 
each justice's degree of willingness to accept congressional latitude in passing legislation. The 
dissenters take a more expansive view of Congress's constitutional role, while the majority reads 
a more limited role from the text. What is more, those who dissent also fashion a much broader 
263 Ibid., 564. 
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interpretation of the role and responsibility of the Court in defining the federal-state relationship, 
while the majority suggests that the constitutional text limits their role. 
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 266 the Court holds that Congress illegitimately used its 
power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act. The case again finds Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and 
O'Connor in the majority, with Ginsberg, Stevens, Breyer, and Souter in dissent. The 
divergence of opinion between the majority and the dissenters turns on the question of whether 
Congress' abrogation is a valid exercise of their power. 
Rehnquist writes the opinion of the Court, while both Stevens and Souter write dissents. 
Both are strikingly strong-worded in their dislike for, or support of, the expansion of the judicial 
role in determining the constitutional nature of Congress' power as it regards the States. 
Rehnquist writes 
The dissent, to the contrary, disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled 
together from law review articles and its own version of historical events. The 
dissent cites not a single decision since Hans (other than Union Gas) that supports 
its view of State sovereign immunity, instead relying upon the now-discredited 
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia ... Its undocumented and highly speculative 
extralegal explanation of the decision in Hans is a disservice to the Court's 
traditional of adjudication.267 
Justice Stevens counters: 
In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable 
involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins 
and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power .. . It may 
well follow that the misguided opinion of today's majority has nothing more than 
an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better reasoning in Justice 
Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one 
day.268 
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There is clearly a very strong difference of opinion on the Court between those who repeatedly 
position themselves in the majority and those who enter opinions in dissent in federalism cases. 
The Court continues to find itself at odds. In Alden v. Maine269, the Court revisits the question of 
a State's sovereign immunity against suit, again dividing 5:4, with the majority holding that 
Congress cannot use its power from Article I to remove a State's sovereign immunity from 
private suits in its own courts. 
Not every institutional federalism case, however, finds the Court dividing along its usual 
lines. Indeed, the Court again finds that Congress exceeded its powers as against the States in 
City of Boerne v. Flores270, this time with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment. In City of 
Boerne, the Court holds that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers 
by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, part of which subjected local ordinances to 
federal regulation. Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg form the six-
person majority; O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer dissent. The majority argues that 
It is for Congress in the first instance to "determin[ e] whether and what legislation 
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment," and its 
conclusions are entitled to much deference ... Congress' discretion is not 
unlimited, however, and the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury 
v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the 
Constitution_ Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to 
maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.271 
Stevens joins the majority not on these grounds, but because he believes the RFRA 
constitutes an establishment of religion and therefore, is a violation of the First 
Amendment. Justice O'Connor's dissent, in which both Justice Breyer and Justice Souter 
concur, is based on her opinion that the Court does not then, nor has in the past, given 
269 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
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enough weight to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She cites the debates 
of the Founding period to argue that religious liberty was perceived much more 
expansively in relation to law than the Court currently allows for. Justices Scalia and 
Stevens, in response to this point of dissent, argue that it is the people, not the Court, who 
are given the responsibility to determine the outcome of concrete cases regarding 
religious expression. City of Boerne is an example of an institutional federalism case in 
which the Rehnquist Court does not divide along its traditional lines. 
Rehnquist and the Court do return, however, to the 5-to-4 split in the cases of 
Printz v. United States272 and United States v. Morrison.273 Both hold that Congress 
lacks the authority to enact the particular pieces oflegislation in question. In Printz, the 
Court finds that Congress cannot use the Necessary and Proper Clause to compel local 
law enforcement officers to perform background checks on handgun purchases until the 
federal government can institute an appropriate system to do the same.274 The Court 
invalidates the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 in Morrison, holding that neither 
the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment offers sufficient justification. In 
each, members of the majority refer to the notion of the original understanding of 
Congress' powers. Citing the Commerce Clause decision in Morrison, Justice Thomas 
cautions against what he and the majority see as the fundamental weakness of the Court's 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
By continuing to apply this rootless and malleable standard, however 
circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its 
view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. Until this Court replaces 
its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with 
272 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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the original understanding, we will continue to see Conrsess appropriating State 
police powers under the guise of regulating commerce. 2 5 
Clearly, the Rehnquist Court has been willing to place limits on Congressional power, yet 
in none of the cases has the Court considered the fundamental cases like Wicka.rd that led to the 
original expansion of congressional power outside what was arguably originally intended by the 
framers of the Constitution. Indeed, the Court has not always found against congressional 
powers. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,276 the justices hold that an 
individual can sue a State for money damages in federal court for violations of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993. Here, Rehnquist breaks from his usual compatriots in institutional 
federalism questions, Scalia, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, to write the 6-to-3 opinion 
which finds that such a measure is warranted because the legislation is simply prophylactic and 
Congress has specifically stated its intention to remove the States' sovereign immunity in this 
area "In sum," Rehnquist concludes, "the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and 
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration ofleave benefits is weighty 
enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic legislation."277 In Reno v. Condon,278 the Court 
unanimously finds the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which limits a State's capacity to release 
drivers' personal information and is enacted under the Commerce Clause, is not a violation of 
constitutional principles of federalism, as the lower courts had held. South Carolina, which 
allowed the release of such information on specific grounds, alleged Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendment violations. Rehnquist notes that, while the Court found action by Congress under 
the Commerce Clause unconstitutional in the past, the principle that operated in those cases does 
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277 Ibid., 735. 
278 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
not apply in this one, because in past cases the Court ''held federal statutes invalid, not because 
Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes violated 
the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.''279 This case, he argues, falls 
solidly under the jurisdiction of interstate commerce, and thus is appropriately to be regulated by 
Congress. 
The Rehnquist Court's record in institutional federalism cases demonstrates a decided 
effort to prevent the overbroad expansion of national power in the form of congressional 
prerogatives. The federalist triumvirate of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas spearheads this effort, 
with O'Connor and Kennedy usually comprising the necessary five votes. Such a majority, 
however, has not been found in rights-based cases. 
B. The Rights-Based Federalism Cases 
Rights-based cases have found the Court quite differently divided. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, for example, a 5-4 Court affirms the Roe decision, the single greatest 
decision altering federal-State relations handed down by the Burger Court.280 The state of 
Pennsylvania passed a law containing numerous provisions regulating abortion procedures, 
including parental consent for minors, a 24 hour waiting period, a guarantee of informed consent, 
and that the husband be informed of his wife's intention to abort. The statute was challenged on 
the grounds that it infringed on the rights guaranteed in the Roe v. Wade decision. 
A 5-4 majority upholds Roe, although it does away with the three-trimester proscription it 
contained. The majority argues that the history of abortion after Roe legitimated its affirmation. 
279 Ibid., 149. 
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We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court 
when the valuation of the State interest came before it as an original matter, 
would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to 
justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain 
exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and, coming as it does 
after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are satisfied that the 
immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue, but the 
precedential force that must be accorded to its holding. And we have concluded 
that the essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed. 281 
Although the Court upholds the majority of the Pennsylvania provisions, allowing that the State 
has a legitimate and "substantial interest in potential life," and striking down only the marital 
consent provision, as it can pose an "undue burden" to women involved in abusive relationships, 
its affirmation of Roe is itself a broad denial of State sovereignty.282 Justices White, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissent on these grounds and argue that stare decisis does 
not bind the Court when a case of constitutional import is wrongly decided; but the majority 
holds that both "principles of institutional integrity and the rule of stare decisis" demand that the 
Court uphold Roe.283 
The decision to uphold Roe, and indeed Roe itself, Justice Scalia argues in his scathing 
dissent, is ultimately "standard less" because the Constitution "says absolutely nothing about 
it."284 "Roe was plainly wrong-and even more so (of course) if the proper criteria of text and 
tradition are applied.''285 In essence, he suggests, the majority of the Court is rejecting the 
constitutional text as the ultimate authority on constitutional matters and replacing it with their 
personal feelings about "liberty" and "the concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
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of the mystery of human life."286 In Scalia's view, the judicial overreaching in both Roe and 
Casey is inexcusable, especially since the Court's decision supplants the right to broker "political 
compromises" that the States should retain. 287 Justice Scalia and those who join his dissent 
believe that Roe clearly violates the principles of federalism that are intended to allow for 
compromises within and disparity between the various States. 
In Romer v. Evans, a 6-3 Court strikes down an amendment to the Colorado State 
Constitution that denies legal protection from discrimination to homosexual and bisexual 
individuals, arguing that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.288 In the opinion, 
Justice Kennedy argues that while the Court in the past has upheld laws under the Equal 
Protection Clause that targeted specific groups, in this case the law is unconstitutional because 
the majority felt that the law cannot be said to "advance a legitimate government interest."289 "If 
the constitutional conception of'equal protection of the laws' means anything," he argues, "it 
must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest."290 
In the dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 
objects to the majority's decision, which they believe is founded more on theories of justice than 
what they understand to be the appropriate basis for Supreme Court decisions-the text of the 
Constitution and prior Court opinions. They particularly question how the majority can make 
such claims of constitutionality without dealing with, and ultimately rejecting, the Burger 
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which denies the constitutionality of precisely the sort 
286 Ibid., 851. 
287 Ibid., 995. 
288 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
289 Ibid., 632. 
290 Ibid., 634. 
ofreasoning that the Court is employing. Without an explicitly constitutional basis for their 
argument, the dissent suggests, the Court is simply picking and choosing based on whim or 
personal preferences what statutes they believe a State is entitled to enact. 
In both Casey and Romer, the fundamental issue of the sovereignty of the States is at 
question. In each, the majority of the Court finds that they, rather than the State, are the 
appropriate detenniners of State interest. The federalist minority on the Court cannot persuade 
their colleagues that in these cases, no less than in the institutional cases discussed before, the 
principles of federalism equally apply. 
When Dickerson v. United States291 came before the Supreme Court in April of 2000, it 
was the expectation of many that Miranda v. Arizona was likely to be overtumed.292 Indeed, the 
Chief Justice has long made quite clear that he is opposed to expanding the power of the federal 
government without clear textual provision for such action in the Constitution, and Miranda 
appears to be just such an expansion. The Court of Appeals held that a confession given by 
Charles Dickerson before he received his Miranda warnings was admissible because it was 
voluntary and made admissible by the passage of a congressional measure293 that legislatively 
overruled the Miranda requirement for voluntary confessions. Dickerson challenges the 
authority of Congress to pass such a law, essentially raising again the question of whether 
Miranda warnings were a guarantee inherent to the Constitution. 
In an opinion startling to many familiar with the Chief Justice's constitutional views, 
Rehnquist writes the Court's 7-2 opinion upholding Miranda and striking down the 
congressional caveat. "Miranda" he argues, "has become embedded in routine police practice to 
291 Dickerson v. United States. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
292 Christopher H. Schroeder, ''Causes of the Recent Tum. in Constitutional Interpretation," Duke 
Law Journal 51 (2001-2002): 312. 
293 18 USC Section 3501. 
the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture"-and this, Rehnquist 
suggested, was "reason enough" not to overrule it. Interestingly, a similar type of reasoning is 
one of the methods of argument used by the majority in Casey to justify the affirmation of the 
Roe decision, an argument that Rehnquist rejects.294 Furthennore, the opinion argues that the 
Miranda warnings are not simply one way to justify a broader constitutional requirement, as the 
dissent insists, but rather that they are themselves constitutionally mandated, at least in the sense 
that Congress cannot then overrule them simply by passing a piece oflegislation. Such a 
statement on the part of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who so often emphasizes his concern with the 
explicit text of the Constitution, is puzzling indeed.295 
Lawrence v. Texas overrules the Burger Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick and 
holds that the constitutional right to privacy extends to homosexual conduct.296 Two Texas 
residents, John Lawrence and Tyron Gamer, were convicted under a State law criminalizing 
intimacy between same-sex couples, and brought a challenge against the legislation. Again, the 
majority in this case finds that it is the Court, rather than the State, who is the most appropriate 
determiner of the State's interest. "The Texas statute," the opinion states, "furthers no legitimate 
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." 
The Lawrence decision is significant on two fronts in relation to the Rehnquist Court's 
federalism jurisprudence. First, it once again involves the Court passing judgment on the 
appropriate interests of a State; and, second, it expands the right to privacy, a right not found 
explicitly in the text of the Constitution. The three dissenters, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas, 
object to the decision on both of these grounds. Neither provides a constitutionally sound basis 
294 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
295 Dickerson could be classified as comprising both institutional and rights-based federalism 
concerns; for its affirmation of Miranda, it is classified here as a rights-based case. 
296 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
for the judgment, they argue, especially one that establishes a precedent so antithetical to State 
prerogatives. 
Indeed, principled constitutional reasoning for the Court's foray into a matter 
traditionally left to the States is sorely lacking. Scalia writes in his blistering dissent, ''Nowhere 
does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a "fundamental right" under the Due 
Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be 
appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."'297 The Court, he 
argues, must provide more concrete standards than simply the justices' "moral disapproval" of 
particular laws if the sovereignty of the States is at issue.298 Advancing anything other than a 
specific constitutional basis for such momentous decisions is untenable. 
The most recent ruling in the line of significant failures of the Rehnquist Court to restore 
federalism is the 5-4 decision in Roper v. Simmons. In this case, the Court holds the death 
penalty unconstitutional for juveniles, thereby invalidating laws establishing the penalty in 
nineteen States.299 In particular, the majority overturns Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), in which 
the entire Court held that such a penalty was not unconstitutional because there was no national 
consensus on whether such treatment was .. cruel and unusual punishment,"300 thereby making it 
a matter appropriately regulated by the States.301 In Roper, the Court holds that such a 
punishment is now "cruel and unusual" for several reasons: the majority of State legislatures 
297 Ibid., 586. 
298 Ibid., 601. 
299 Jane Roh, Supreme Court Rules Death Penalty for Youths Unconstitutional (Fox News 
Online, 2 March 2005.) [Online] available from 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,149080,00.html; accessed 26 March; Internet. 
30° From the Eighth Amendment, which reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 
301 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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have prohibited it, the justices feel the punishment was disproportionate in the case of juveniles; 
and international consensus is against this type of punishment. 
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas dissent. In this case, Justice O'Connor joins 
them, although she writes a separate dissent, basing her argument on the inability of the majority 
to adequately ground their argument that all juveniles are undeserving of this punishment, and 
suggesting that it is reasonable to expect State parties involved in judgment of juveniles to be 
able to assess the severity of a particular juveniles crime. In his dissent, Scalia quotes Alexander 
Hamilton's discussion of Supreme Court power in The Federalist, in which Hamilton remarked 
that the judiciary would have ''neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment."302 Removing 
the right to decide the acceptability of such a punishment from the States on the grounds the 
majority presented, he argues, is the function of just such a will, and in violation of the 
fundamental principles of federalism and separation of powers espoused by the Framers of the 
Constitution. 
The Roper case is the most recent substantial evidence that a majority of the justices on 
the Rehnquist Court is prepared to continue to restrict State sovereignty when it involves 
questions of individual rights.303 This is in keeping with the general trend of the Court to divide 
over institutional federalism cases and rights-based federalism cases. Although justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas are, on the whole, predictably federalist in their arguments, they 
are unable to convince a sufficient number of the other members of the Court in rights·based 
cases that their concerns about the erosion of State sovereignty are warranted. 
302 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, 464. (emphasis in the original) 
303 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
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Limits of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Revolution 
Even the most cursory glance at the record of the Rehnquist Court in institutional and 
rights-based federalism cases reveals why underlying cases like Wickard are never reconsidered. 
The votes simply are not there. Thus, something other than a true restoration of federalism has 
been the end of the effort. A footnote midway through Rehnquist's Lopez opinion offers one of 
the more illuminating explanations of this failure. "Although I might be willing to return to the 
original understanding," Rehnquist writes, "I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the 
day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare 
decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean."304 The 
Rehnquist Court's federalism, then, has not been a revolution, but rather a stop-gap measure, and 
an incomplete one at that. 
The Rehnquist Court has not enacted a revolution in favor of State sovereignty. If 
anything, the record shows that the decisions in institutional federalism cases are little more than 
efforts to follow more closely the text of the Constitution. Furthermore, in rights-based 
federalism cases, the sovereignty of the States is rarely if ever a serious consideration for the 
majority of the justices. In the final analysis, such considerations are more a function of a 
commitment to judicial restraint than they are a commitment to federalism for federalism's sake. 
304 United States. v. Lopez, 600. 
Epilogue: Federalism and the Limits of Judicial Power 
There are those who allege that the very fact that the Rehnquist Court has struck down so 
many congressional laws makes it by definition an activist court. Thomas M. Keck calls this 
Court "the most activist supreme court in history", citing the 40 federal statutes invalidated on 
constitutional grounds. 305 Larry Kramer describes the Court as "aggressive" in its enforcement 
of limits on Congress.306 "Hence, while reaffirming [the Supreme Court's] supremacy in the 
domain of individual rights, the present Court has gone beyond the activism of the Warren and 
Burger Courts by simultaneously discarding or constricting the doctrines and principles that 
served after 1937 to limit the Court's authority in other areas."307 
Cass Sunstein contests the basis for the Rehnquist Court decisions striking down 
congressional laws-"originalism, as a guide to constitutional interpretation ... should be rejected 
on the ground that it does not promote democracy, rightly understood. It is therefore an 
unacceptable form of maximalism-judicial hubris masquerading as judicial modesty."308 Mark 
Tushnet describes the Court as ushering in a "new constitutional order" by enforcing "a 
reduction in the scope of national power"309 Tuslmet thinks that the distinction made between 
conservatives and liberals on the Court as supporting restraint or activism, respectively, is a 
305 Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court, 40. 
306 Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004 ), 225. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 262-263. 
309 Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 
141. 
highly misleading characterizati<m.310 On the Rehnquist Court, he argues, "everyone is a judicial 
activist," as is the Court itself, having "invalidated laws whose constitutionality was clear under 
long-established doctrine" and "asserted ... a primary role in enforcing the legal boundaries 
Congress has to respect."311 
At their core, all of these critiques of the Rehnquist Court tum on the notion that the 
Court's invalidation of a multiplicity of federal laws is the hallmark of judicial activism. In 
order to accept that these actions constitute activism, one must also accept that the Supreme 
Court is not the final body charged by the Constitution with the interpretation of that document, 
and more specifically, that adhering to the text of the same constitutes an overly narrow and thus, 
in its own way, activist approach to judging. To concede this argument, however, requires a 
concomitant acceptance of the idea that the constitutional text should not be the sole guide for 
the judge, and more importantly, that the Supreme Court cannot claim final authority in the 
interpretation of the constitutional text. 
Accepting this claim concerning the role of the Supreme Court, however, necessitates 
rejecting that the separation of powers is an integral part of the American constitutional system. 
As Rehnquist himself explains in United States v. Morrison, to take such a position is to ignore 
the crucial role of this structure, something that he is unwilling to do. 
As we have repeatedly noted, the Framers crafted the federal system of 
government so that the people's rights would be secured by the division of power. 
Departing from their parliamentary past, the Framers adopted a written 
Constitution that further divided authority at the federal level so that the 
Constitution's provisions would not be defined solely by the political branches nor 
the scope of legislative power limited only by public opinion and the legislature's 
self-restraint. It is thus a "pennanent and indispensable feature of our 
constitutional system" that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of 
310 Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005), 11. 
31 l Ibid. 
the law of the Constitution." No doubt the political branches have a role in 
interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has 
remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.312 
The Supreme Court fulfills a very particular and very important role in the American 
constitutional system. To argue that the Court fulfilling that constitutionally defined role is 
somehow an overbroad use of its power is to unreasonably promote the constitutional authority 
of the other branches and advocate an unbalanced constitutional structure. 
The Rehnquist Court's Federalism Jurisprudence 
In many ways, the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has shown itself to be the opposite of 
the new jurisprudence of the Court that was ushered in after 1937. National League of Cities v. 
Usery was the only Court ruling after 1937 and before the Rehnquist Court to invalidate an 
exercise of the commerce power on Tenth Amendment, State sovereignty grounds.313 The 
fundamental message of the 1937 Court's doctrine was that economic regulation and expansion 
of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was constitutionally acceptable almost without 
limits, while rights claims, for the most part, were the purview of the federal judiciary. Today, 
the Rehnquist Court operates in a manner that has only modified part of that arrangement, 
attempting to limit the power that Congress may wield under the Commerce Clause while 
accepting the argument that many rights are too constitutionally significant to be left to the care 
of the States. 
312 United States v. Morrison, 616. 
313 Curt A. Levey, "Acid Test of Federalism," Legal Times, 29 March 1999: 17. 
90 
Felix Frankfurter wrote that the Commerce Clause "has throughout the Court's history 
been the chief source of its adjudications regarding federalism."314 In the case of the Rehnquist 
Court, the Commerce Clause has been the chief source of its adjudications resulting in the 
allegation of a federalism revolution. In The Federalist, James Madison wrote of the Commerce 
Clause: "The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition 
which few oppose and from which no apprehensions are entertained."315 Indeed, the Commerce 
Clause was not understood nor enacted as an engine of overarching congressional power, but 
rather a clause allowing for what was agreed to be a very specific and necessary function of the 
national government-keeping order in commerce between the various States. In a sense, this is 
the original understanding that Rehnquist and the Rehnquist Court majority have been trying to 
return to the clause. 
The overall effect of this effort, however, appears to be at best a moderate alteration in 
the understanding of acceptable limits of congressional power. The Court has started to apply a 
more stringent effects doctrine, akin to that used by the pre-1937 Court, which encompasses a 
stricter notion of what may justifiably be understood as commerce. Prior to the Rehnquist Court, 
legislation that either involved commerce or interstate matters was allowed to stand~ the current 
Court has only attempted to require that both elements be present for a law to stand. However, 
the Court has in no way seriously considered the validity of significant precedent cases like 
Wickard that establish the basis for an expansive effects doctrine, and as a result "it is entirely 
unrealistic to think that the Court can place real limits on the commerce power by tightening the 
affects doctrine" as it would "require overruling many decisions" that even the most committed 
314 Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1937), 66-67. 
315 James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, 290. 
federalism champions on the Court have showed little interest in doing.316 Indeed, some would 
argue that allowing the effects doctrine to stand, in and of itself, is out of step with the original 
meaning of the constitutional text. 
The Court's repeatedly shifting construction of the Commerce Clause indicates 
that it does not speak with the voice of the Constitution, but rather reflects a given 
majority's personal predilections. To return to the 1787 meaning of"commerce" 
as the interchange of goods, of"among" as "between" the States, and to discard 
the "affects" commerce, would offer a more secure mooring and effectuate the 
Founders' design.317 
Be that as it may, the plain fact of the matter is that the Rehnquist Court does not appear likely to 
deal with expansive effects doctrine precedents, let alone return the Commerce Clause to the 
limited definition presented above. In this way, the federalism revolution has been, quite simply, 
a revolution that wasn't. 
That the fluctuating federalist majority on the Court that regularly holds together in 
institutional federalism cases falls apart so often in rights-based cases suggests something 
significant about the controlling interests of the swing voters in the two types of cases, Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy. It seems clear that for these two justices, a federalism interest is more 
about restricting Congress and less about protecting the sovereignty of the States. That is to say, 
their first commitment is not to State sovereignty as such. Since they often support federalism 
claims in institutional federalism cases, it seems clear that their interest is buttressed more by a 
concern with overly expansive congressional power, and less by an interest in the States 
themselves having a constitutional prerogative against that power. By virtue of the philosophy 
of these two pragmatists, the most abiding federalism interest of the meager majority of the 
316 Lino Graglia, "United State v. Lopez: Judicial Review under the Commerce Clause," Texas 
Law Review 74 (1995-1996): 768. 
317 Raoul Berger, "Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause," Texas Law Review 74 
(1995-1996): 717. 
Rehnquist Court as a whole is not much more than keeping Congress from moving beyond the 
expanded powers it currently possesses. 
This is not what Chief Justice Rehnquist would desire to be the jurisprudential bent of his 
Court. In rights-based cases he is almost always the member of the minority who advocates the 
sovereignty of the States as the controlling concern. This commitment to federalism is not 
simply one of federalism for federalism's sake. Rather, Rehnquist champions federalism in 
rights-based cases because such a position opposes the expansion of extra-textual rights, such as 
the right to privacy. He believes that the meaning of the constitutional text cannot simply be 
defined by whatever the justices current views are of correct law and morality, and although the 
majority of the Court rarely agrees, supporting State sovereignty is one way that Rehnquist can 
advocate judicial restraint. 
There have been anomalies in Rehnquist's cases over the years, particularly his surprising 
opinion in Dickerson v. United States.318 A careful assessment of the realities of that case, 
however, provides an interesting and ultimately satisfying explanation for this otherwise odd 
opinion. The final split, 7-2, indicates that the case clearly was going to be decided in favor of 
Miranda with or without the Chief Justice's vote. The motivation for Rehnquist to join the 
majority, then, can be surmised to be not simply to lend another vote to the decision, but to 
assure that the opinion did not establish the Miranda guarantees, clearly not contained in the text 
of the Constitution, as fundamental constitutional rights. Furthermore, Rehnquist's other 
motivation was the preservation of the "permanent and indispensable feature of our 
318 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
constitutional system," that of the supremacy of the Supreme Court "in the exposition of the law 
of the Constitution."319 As one commentator aptly noted, 
What seems to have motivated Rehnquist was not loyalty to Miranda's 
protections but rather institutional protectiveness. Miranda, his opinion noted, is a 
constitutional decision of the Supreme Court; if an act of Congress could overrule 
Miranda, the Supreme Court's authority over other issues would not long survive 
unchallenged.320 
Dickerson represents not so much an anomaly in the Chief Justice's jurisprudence as it does a 
shrewd attempt to craft an opinion that firmly establishes an important textual provision of the 
Constitution-the supremacy of the Supreme Court in matters of constitutional law-in a less 
than ideal circumstance. 
A commitment to judicial restraint and textualism marks the opinions in the institutional 
federalism cases that the Rehnquist Court has considered. It is these cases, and indeed, these 
cases alone, that have engendered the label of federalism revolution, as the rights-based 
federalism cases demonstrate a continuing judicial bias toward national involvement. In these 
institutional cases, both Rehnquist and the Rehnquist Court have shown themselves to be 
operating on a certain level of practicality: some things, like increased expansion of 
congressional powers, may be slowed; other things, including assumptions made by precedent 
cases on which the entire national administration is built, are not so movable. The Rehnquist 
Court may have slowed by degrees the general expansion of congressional power, but despite 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's best efforts, the expansion of judicial prerogative to declare new 
meanings of the constitutional text remains. 
319 United States v. Morrison, 616. 
320 Editorial, "Miranda Rights Reread," The Nation June 29, 2000; [Online]; available from 
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